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In the last decade, a growing number of psycholo­
gists have realized that academic psychology could be 
applied to the study and practice of law. The question of 
witness reliability in a criminal proceeding points to 
problems of memory and emotion. Personality variables and 
behavior pathology are often involved in the disposition of 
wills and in divorce actions. Research studies in industrial 
psychology are relevant in trademark and patent litigations; 
when a plea of insanity is offered, courts frequently summon 
an expert whose testimony is based on psychological testing 
and clinical diagnosis. Research in developmental psychology 
is often cited when judges sentence juvenile delinquents 
(Redmount, 196?)•
General interest in forensic psychology is a com­
paratively recent phenomenon, but attempts to apply psy­
chology to the law are as old as experimental psychology
1
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itself. By publishing On the Witness Stand in I908, Hugo 
Munsterberg, who was trained at Leipzig by Wundt, became a 
pioneer in the field. As director of the first psychologi­
cal laboratory in America, he turned his attention, much 
to his teacher's displeasure, to applied research. Alfred 
Binet (1857-I9II), adjunct professor of experimental and 
comparative psychology at the College of France, wrote 
about the accrued advantages of a science of testimony and 
of the immediacy of its need. No doubt his obtaining a law 
degree in l8?8 contributed to his interest in the area.
After completing gymnasium. Max Wertheimer (188O- 
1943), father of Gestalt psychology, studied law at the 
University of Prague. William Stern (1871-1938), a fourth 
pioneer who studied successively with Ebbinghaus and 
Stumpf at Berlin, wrote numerous articles on the relation­
ship between psychology and the law. Other noteworthy 
contributions in those early years were made by Hans Gross 
of Prague, F. Gorphe at Paris, and Guy Whipple at Cornell.
Although a number of articles dealing with the 
problem of witness testimony were published in the first 
15 years of this century, a hiatus in research and exposi­
tion appeared during the 1920's, 30's, 40's, and the early 
50's. During the first half of the twentieth century, few 
books treating the area of forensic psychology were pub­
lished in America: Munsterberg (1908), G. F . Arnold (1913),
B. Glueck (1916), M. R. Brown (1926), and H. E. Burtt (1931)
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Moreover, only a few applied psychology texts dealt with 
its substantive aspects: Munsterberg (l9l4), Hollingworth
& Poffenberger (l92l), Grey (l94l), Husband (1949) and 
Fryer & Henry (1950).
Did psychologists stop researching the law because 
of methodological stalemate or because of more compelling 
problems? A definitive answer is not available. It is 
likely, however, that the Zeitgeist of jurist opinion 
played a complicating role. Beginning with the telling 
invective--that experimental psychologists would be no 
more welcome in his courtroom than Sherlock Holmes-- 
advocate Charles Moore (1907) accused Professor Munsterberg 
of practicing "yellow psychology."
More recently, under a $400,000 grant by the Ford 
Foundation to study the judicial process, a prominent group 
of University of Chicago jurists and behavioral scientists 
"bugged" a juryroom in order to record and analyze jury 
deliberations along social-psychological dimensions. On 
October 12, 1955t a congressional subcommittee of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee under the Internal Security Act 
held hearings to investigate both the jury "bugging" inci­
dent and a subsequent presentation of its recorded product 
at the tenth judicial conference at Estes Park, Colorado.
Much congressional inquiry fixated on the possi­
bility of communist subversion. Dean of the Chicago Law 
School and project director, Edward Levi was quizzed
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concerning a letter he had signed, critical of the House 
UnAmerican Activities Committee. Two co-signers of the 
letter were allegedly American communist party leaders.
It was also established that Dean Levi knew a University 
of Chicago student named Ira Kipnis, a known communist, 
and that Levi had contributed to the American Civil Liber­
ties Union.
The subcommittee also noted that Professor Harry 
Kalven, a second project director, had some years before 
sent a personal letter to President Truman asking for a 
review of the Rosenberg atomic spy case. The letter was 
published by the Daily Worker, a communist newspaper.
Other testimony focused on the Estes Park Conference 
itself, an august gathering which included former supreme 
court justice Tom Clark. At this conference, Fred 
Strodtbeck, colleague of Levi and Kalven, presented the 
recorded jury deliberation and was allegedly introduced 
to the audience as Mr. X (Committee on Judiciary, 1955)»
In the last ten years, legislators and attorneys 
have become more receptive to social science in general 
and to psychology in particular. Social scientists, for 
their part, have become more sensitive to the procedures 
and precedents of the law, understanding that if they want 
to apply their insights and methodology to the law, they 
must do so within a specifiable framework. They must not 
disrupt ongoing legal processes , and they cannot take it
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upon themselves to change legal procedures. Within this 
framework, behavioral scientists have already made a 
contribution in the study of jury trials.
Juror selection and judgment. Melvin Belli (1956), 
a prominent attorney, has written, "I never saw a jury 
that didn't try to do its level best." Dwight McCarty
(i960), author of a textbook on legal psychology, has 
stated, "The jury often senses truth through its common 
knowledge of human nature |̂ p. 397]*" In contrast, Alexis 
de Tocqueville (1863) wryly viewed the jury system as con­
tributing to the tyranny of the American majority. To the 
psychologist, the description of jurors as twelve men, 
good and true, who impartially sift truth from trial evi­
dence without regard for intra-group composition, attitudes, 
values or set, appears naïve. For perception and judgment, 
regardless of verbal report, are not only a product of 
stimulus factors but of functional factors as well (Sherif 
& Sherif, 1948; Fergus, 1966) and the greater the stimulus 
ambiguity, the greater is the salience of functional con­
tribution (Luchins, 1950).
Behavioral scientists have noted that juries are 
not representatively sampled. Not all juries, however, are 
intended to be so. Both at common law and in statute, pro­
visions exist for special, struck, and blue ribbon juries, 
which may be convened when it is important for jurors to 
have specifiable qualifications. Notwithstanding, a
6
Los Angeles survey discovered juryrooras packed with house­
wives, clerical workers, craftsmen, and retired personnel 
(Holbrock, 1956). In a Chicago study, a marked increase 
in the number of female jurors was observed along with a 
regression towards the mean in juror educational achieve­
ment. A slight increase in lower income group participa­
tion was also noted (Breeder, 1958).
Jury composition is especially important to the 
attorney during voir dire examination. In the case of 
pre-emptory dismissals, a physiognomic approach has enjoyed 
some popularity. McCart (1964) has explained its appli­
cation: "The meeting of the eyebrows and closely knit eyes
indicates narrow mindedness, having an upper eyelid cover 
more than a third of the iris suggests secretiveness, the 
short upper lip is responsive to charm jp. 35^-" While 
Sheldon's somatotypes based on anthropometric measures, and 
claiming a morphologic base are still provocative, numerous 
methodological problems cloud their validity. Even so, a 
recent survey reported by McCart has purported that ecto­
morphs provide lower damage awards in civil cases than do 
mesomorphs or endomorphs. Not surprisingly, ectomorphs 
provide lower damage awards in civil cases than do meso­
morphs or endomorphs. Not surprisingly, ectomorphs were 
defined as persons who tire themselves out in attempting 
to do too much.
An increase in female jury participation has
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already been noted, raising the question of sex differ­
ences in jury verdicts (Holbrook, 1956). By stimulating 
jury deliberations, Marston (1924) found that females 
were superior to their male counterparts in evaluating 
testimony, contradicting earlier work by Munsterberg (l9l4). 
Munsterberg, who asked subjects to render both pre- and 
post-deliberation judgments concluded that females were 
less able to profit from group problem solving. His 
sampling procedure, however, does not meet present day 
standards since male subjects were chosen from a group of
advanced graduate students at Harvard, and female subjects
from undergraduate classes at a nearby college.
Addressing himself to the same problem, Burtt
(1931) drew all his subjects from a relatively homogeneous 
undergraduate population and found that females profited 
more from group discussion than males. A more contemporary 
study by Strodtbeck and Mann (1956) compared the relative 
activity of male and female mock jurors. Males tended to 
initiate relatively long periods of verbal activity; 
problem solving was high on their motivational hierarchy. 
Females however, tended to only react to the original 
contribution of the males.
Other socio-cultural variables such as social 
status, ethnic and educational differences among jurors 
have been studied. During face to face interaction, 
jurors from low social status groups became more highly
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evaluated (Strodtbeck, James & Hawkins, 1957)- High status 
jurors participated more fully in group discussion and 
derived more satisfaction from their jury experience. Cues 
to social stratification are often provided by dress , 
habits of speech, reference to previous experiences, and 
even home addresses (Gordon & Jacobs, 1968). In the 
Strodtbeck, James and Hawkins (195?) study, subjects were 
also asked to designate jury composition preferences in the 
event that a relative became a defendant or litigant. 
Laborers preferred a jury of skilled workers, but subjects 
of all other occupational groupings chose a jury of pro­
prietors. These findings are consistent with the predic­
tions of reference group theory (Sherif, 1953).
Actual jurors of German and British descent have 
been found to favor the state in trial proceedings whereas 
Negroes, Slavs, and Italians tend to vote for the defendant. 
While ingroup membership affects jury verdicts, education 
achievement does not, a conclusion which grew out of an 
experimental study by James (1959). The emergence of 
consonance or dissonance in group decision making, the 
author concluded, was unrelated to academic achievement.
The less educated juror did not appear to be a rubber stamp 
for his better educated counterpart.
Impressed perhaps by the effects of ingroup member­
ship on jury verdicts, Simon (1963) designed two creative 
mock jury studies. In the first study, mental patients
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were selected for jury participation on the basis of 
diagnostic data. Groups of paranoids, depressives, and 
psychopaths were presented an actual case involving a plea 
of insanity to an incest charge. Compared to normal control 
juries, a greater percentage of mental patients found the 
Defendant not guilty by reason of insanity. Curiously, 
paranoid judgments and group interaction were discovered 
to be substantially similar to that of normal jurors. 
Depressives, however, were dismayed over the Defendant's 
lack of remorse while the psychopaths were obsessed with 
legal inequities (Simon, 1963).
In the second study, sex and property offenders 
deliberated an identical incest case involving the insanity 
plea. The verdicts rendered by sex and property offenders 
were not significantly disparate, but post-experimental 
interviews proved instructive. Many sex offenders reported 
voting for the Defendant out of empathetic identification. 
Others, though sympathetic, voted "guilty" out of an 
apparent sense of duty. When the property offenders voted 
"not guilty by reason of insanity," it was their intention 
to place the greatest degree of social distance possible 
between themselves and the Defendant, to punish him for 
his "henious" behavior. Property offenders who voted the 
Defendant "guilty" expressed contempt and their desire for 
his incarceration (Simon, 1964).
Individual functional factors affect the percep­
tion, judgment, and set of jurors as cogently as group
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factors. Whipple (1915)> for example, reported on Kohler's 
(I9l4) experiment involving a staged brawl between two 
legal society members. Two court panels, one composed of 
psychologists, the other of judges, were instructed to 
review the facts of the incident. While excitement or 
increased activation level improved their observation to a 
point, oversimplification and distortion occurred in the 
testimony of all participants. The technique of using 
deception in forensic research is not a recent development. 
As early as 1909, Whipple reported on a study in the 
seminary of V. Liszt of Berlin where a carefully enacted 
attempted murder was staged before an aghast student body.
In civil cases, the set and past experience of 
jurors affect their damage awards. The plaintiff's request 
seems to serve as an anchor for their judgment (Breeder, 
1958). It is therefore of some consequence whether a 
plaintiff hoping for a $10,000 personal injury settlement 
requests an award of $8,000 or $80,000.
To further illustrate the dynamics of social percep­
tion, Breeder (1958) cites the following case: An attrac­
tive 22 year old mother was awarded only one-half her 
requested award which was based on her deceased husband's 
life expectancy and potential earning power. The jury 
reasoned that a woman as attractive as the Plaintiff could 
certainly marry within a year or two and her failure to do 
so would not be the Defendant's responsibility.
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Courtroom dynamics. Before a witness testifies in 
a trial, he must swear to "tell the truth, the whole truth 
and nothing but the truth." At common law, an oath was 
mandatory and each witness was required to kiss the Bible. 
To meet health standards, witnesses now place only their 
right hand on the Bible. Testimony by atheists was tradi­
tionally ruled invalid because their oath was thought to 
be suspect.
Psychologists began to investigate the oath 
phenomenon and its effect on the veracity of testimony 
early in the present century. After presenting a motion 
picture to experimental subjects. Boring (1916) recorded 
the number of questions pertaining to the film which they 
were willing to answer under oath. By recording errors, 
testimony of female subjects was found to involve fewer 
errors or inaccuracies under the oath condition than non­
oath condition. The lower error rate of sworn testimony 
was also present in samples of men, boys, and girls. In a 
study employing a similar paradigm. Brown (1926) found 
errors in unsworn testimony to be 1.8 times greater than 
those in sworn testimony. The testimony of children even 
under oath, however, has been found to be laden with 
inaccuracies, distortions and exaggerations.
To be admissable in court, sworn testimony must 
be relevant, competent and material. An allegation of 
improper testimony is ruled on by the judge who has the
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power to sustain or overrule the objection. An attorney 
who does not accept the judge's ruling may state "excep­
tion," which can be used later as a basis for appeal.
Early research on the judicial process was stimulated 
by the rules of evidence as regards witness testimony and 
questioning by counsels.
Repetition of testimony, for example, has been 
found to fixate the repeated items in memory regardless of 
their truth and in such cases, statements by witnesses seem 
to be based more on previous testimony than on the original 
incident. Moreover, expectative or implicative questions 
evoke more errors in testimony than straightforward ques­
tions. It was also found that greater suggestibility 
results from questions including more than one negative 
and from questions that do not include personal pronouns 
(Berrian, 1955; Burtt, 1931; Cady, 1924; Marston, 1924; 
Muscio, 1915; Whipple, I909).
Similarly, an ordering effect in testimony presen­
tation has also been noted. In a study involving a bigamy 
case, testimony and evidence of the defense were presented 
first, followed by that of the prosecution. In the treat­
ment condition, the presentation of evidence was reversed. 
Presenting defense material last in sequence was found to 
be decidedly favorable to the defendant (Weld & Ruff, 1938). 
In a second study. Weld and Danzig (1940) discovered that 
the first witness for the defense or prosecution was
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generally most effective in persuading the jury and that 
the prestige of the attorneys also affected their verdict.
Other procedural problems such as the judge's 
charge to the jury have come under study. After questioning 
actual jurors on various phases of a litigation in which 
they had rendered a verdict, Hunter (1935) concluded that 
the average juror either did not understand the law appli­
cable to the case or was not able to apply it appropriately. 
A decade later, Hervey (19^7) reported on the findings of 
two federal judges who sent questionnaires to 375 jurors 
who had served in federal or state courts in three mid- 
western states. Out of 185 replies, 73 jurors reported not 
having understood the judge's instructions. Hoffman and 
Bradley (1952) in a mock trial at Yale Law School found 
jurors unable to disregard testimony ruled inadmissable 
and predisposed to judge a defendant guilty because he was 
brought to trial in the first place.
In a study of insanity pleas, a case based on 
Durham v. United States (195^) was played to 20 mock juries. 
One-half of the juries were instructed by the McNaughten 
Rule which involves the defendant's ability to distinguish 
right from wrong. The other half were instructed by the 
Durham Rule which involves the question of whether the 
crime was the product of a mental illness. Varying instruc­
tions did not have a systematic affect on jury verdicts. 
Again, juries did not ignore the judge's charge, but they
Ik
did misunderstand it (James, 1959). There are exceptions 
to the general rule that jurors must take the law as 
instructed by the judge. Nineteen state constitutions 
allow the jury to be judge of both fact and law in criminal 
trials. In other states, the judge's instructions are 
advisory only (McCart, 1964).
Jury deliberations. Inside the jury room, the 
first official act of jury members is to select a foreman, 
who becomes presiding officer and group spokesman. Sevan, 
Albert, Loiseaux, Mayfield and Wright (1958), in a tightly 
knit experiment, manipulated the variables of foreman 
leadership and prestige. The mock jury foreman, con­
federates of the Experimenter, were trained in either demo­
cratic or autocratic discussion leadership. To manipulate 
prestige, the foremen were introduced to fellow jurors 
either as shoe salesmen or college professors. In all 
cases, juries positively responded to the foreman's move 
for higher damage awards. The issue as to whether high or 
low prestige foremen were more effective in gaining higher 
settlements however, was not clearly established.
Other empirical work has focused on the manner in 
which jury foremen are selected. Strodtbeck and Hook 
(1961), for example, found that mock jurors of proprietor- 
manager backgrounds were chosen as foremen more frequently 
than chance expectation. Upon entering the jury room, 
these same individuals tended to sit at the end table
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positions. This becomes meaningful when connected to the 
observation that most Americans have an internalized set 
to perceive authority figures at end table positions.
Dasheill (1935) raised the important question as to 
whether jury judgments were more accurate than the judgment 
of a single juror. To this end, he arranged mock juries 
whose members answered questionnaires based on the substance 
of a short film, collectively and individually. The jurors 
were not allowed to see the film directly, rather it was 
related to them by witnesses. Juror judgments were found 
to be less accurate than the judgments of witnesses, but 
jury judgments were superior to the judgments of individual 
jurors.
A corollary issue raised by de Tocqueville (1863) 
has yet to be considered. Even if a group judgment is 
more accurate than individual judgments, is it so at the 
expense of minority group sentiment? It was this question 
that motivated James Madison to write Federalist essay 
No. 10. Kalven (1957) provides some insight on this point. 
After simulating jury conditions, he found that 97% of all 
cases where criminal libel was at issue, if the majority 
voted "not guilty" on the first ballot, the final verdict 
was "not guilty." Hung juries, he discovered, emerged 
only when a substantial minority was present at the outset 
and additional support seemed possible.
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The judge and the jury. The sixth amendment guar­
antees swift and public trials in criminal cases, and the 
seventh amendment provides for jury trials in civil cases 
where the amount at issue exceeds twenty dollars. America’s 
court docket is congested. Because of this, some jurists 
ask if it is not more expedient to give judges a larger 
share of the judicial burden as is the recent trend in the 
British court system from which our own system is derived.
Do qualitative differences in judge and jury verdict dispo­
sitions exist?
A report on the University of Chicago Jury Project 
suggests that differences in verdict dispositions between 
the judge and the jury do indeed exist (Breeder, 195Ô).
Three thousand questionnaires were sent to members of the 
judicial profession inquiring whether their personal ver­
dicts differed from the official verdicts of juries over 
which they presided. Data analysis proved definitive. 
Consensus would have existed only 19?̂  of the time.
Is the judge's verdict based on a more accurate 
assessment of evidence than the jury's? Marston (1924) 
compared testimony evaluation scores of a single judge 
with that of two juries, one male, the other female, along 
the dimensions of completeness and accuracy. Not only was 
the female jury found to be superior to the male jury for 
both variables, but the single judge was able to outperform 
either. What is disturbing, however, is that the judge
17
was only 8l% accurate and he was the famous Dean Wigmore.
A corollary issue is whether or not judges' ver­
dicts are more consistent than those of juries. Gaudet 
(1938), in a review of the literature, concluded that 
judges differ markedly in sentencing behavior. In a New 
Jersey study, he noted, one judge gave almost two times as 
many penal sentences as his colleagues. Judges were also 
found to be idiosyncratic as regards particular kinds of 
offenses, and many trial attorneys maintain that they can 
differentiate between lenient and severe judges as regards 
a particular issue.
Variability in sentencing behavior was also noted 
in a study by Burtt (1931). In one sample, penal sentences 
given by judges peaked at 3, 10, I3 , 20, 25 years and 
also about 1, 3, 6, and 9 months. In a second study, he 
reported that out of 88O penal sentences studied, 36O were 
for 3 years, 60 for k years, 240 for 5 years and 20 for 
6 years. He correctly labels as problematic, the possi­
bility that a large number of convicted offenders could 
deserve 3 or 5 year sentences as opposed to 4 year terms.
Broader (1958) has noted other interesting judge- 
jury differences. Judges have been found more prone to 
convict in criminal cases. In awarding damages in tort 
actions, the jury seems to increase the award if the 
defendant is a corporation, railroad, city or state. In 
one study, awards by juries ran as much as 30% higher than
18
awards made by judges.
The judge's role is unique. His bench is a step 
higher than the jury box and two steps higher than the 
litigants and their counsels. His black robe and gavel 
differentiate him from other courtroom participants. As 
he leaves his chambers to enter the court, everyone is 
asked to rise. To understand the behavior of an indi­
vidual judge, Winick, Gerver & Blumberg (1961) suggest 
that the following questions be answered: "Does the judge
sit in original or appellate jurisdiction; is he appointed 
or elected; what is his age, ethnic group membership and 
marital status [p. 12l] ? "
Why has psychology neglected the law? It is 
possible that psychologists are simply not interested in 
studying the law, feeling that their skills are better 
actualized in the generic areas of perception, learning, 
motivation or in the established applied areas of clinical, 
industrial and educational psychology. This assumption is 
untenable. The history of psychology is a fluid history; 
pioneer work has traditionally been directed towards new 
and challenging applications. For example, with the advent 
of World War I, psychologists began to apply their skills 
to problems of personnel selection and human engineering.
It can also be argued that psychology does not have 
the scientific tools to make a meaningful contribution in 
this area. This position cannot be dismissed lightly.
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The mock jury trial seems to be a workable medium for 
experimentation; the risks of inference should not be 
greater than those inherent in any other psychological 
laboratory research. Sevan's 1958 mock jury experiment 
exemplifies a methodologically well-knit study of this type. 
The more recent emphasis on unobtrusive indices of intra- 
and inter-individual behavior seems promising (Webb, 
Campbell, Schwartz & Sechrest, 1966). Strodtbeck and Hook
(1961) social distance model and Gaudet's (1938) archival 
study illustrate the technique.
Others might still argue that the law of the land 
is such that laboratory research can never be validated by 
studies of actual courtroom behavior, that lawmakers and 
attorneys are suspicious of and resistant to behavioral 
research. This notion lies at the core of the dilemma of 
forensic psychology. Moore's 190? cry of "yellow psy­
chology" has extended to the 1955 congressional investiga­
tion of behavioral science-communist collusion at Wichita, 
Kansas.
The differences between psychology and the law 
should, on the other hand, not be minimized. Psychology 
is basically experimental and inductive; the law is basi­
cally rational and deductive. Psychology assumes a deter­
ministic basis for man's actions and shrouds its concepts 
in relative terms. The law assumes a voluntaristic source 
of man's actions and couches its concepts in absolute
20
terms. Psychology seeks its answers in future research. 
The law, for the most part, seeks its answers in legal 
theory and precedent. Yet one overriding commonality 
emerges. Psychology and the law are both concerned with 
human behavior: to study it and aid in its actualization,
the other to codify rules for the protection of men and to 
guide the behavior of men in relationship to one another 
(Gordon & Temerlin, 1968).
CHAPTER II
PROBLEM
In 1066 A.D., at the time of the Norman invasion of 
England, legal systems were based on social custom and on 
normative behavior patterns. Because printing facilities 
were not available, this law was passed on by word of mouth.
A judge appointed by a nobleman traveled to various towns 
to hold court and his decision involved finding the custom 
or norm most appropriate to the case at hand. Once rendered, 
a verdict became a precedent to be followed by other judges 
in similar cases. This system of law by precedent per­
sisted in time and is generally referred to as "the common 
law." It is clearly a judge-made law (McCart, 1964).
During this period, two methods of trial were 
generally employed. First, compurgation provided that an 
individual told the truth if he could find 36 men to agree 
that he was an honorable man, a method of trial not 
abolished until l833- Second, there was trial by water or 
fire which if survived, was regarded to mean that the 
accused had stated the truth. Related to this was trial 
by combat, which was resolved when one of the disputing 
parties surrendered or was killed. It was not until the
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reign of Henry II, which extended from 1154-1189, that trial 
by jury was used to an appreciable extent in civil disputes 
involving land claims. With time, it became extended to 
other categories of civil disputes.
Trial by jury in criminal cases was adopted more 
slowly. By the middle of the 12th century, 12 men were 
required at every court session to name suspected criminals 
but trial by ordeal was still employed. When Pope Inno­
cent 111 forbade ordeal for priests. King Henry 111 followed 
suit by ordering criminal cases to be tried by juries of 
peers. Even so, grand and petit juries were not yet dis­
tinct , and Parliament had just begun to authorize men to 
practice law.
The use of witnesses developed gradually, which 
not surprisingly, also led to the problem of perjury. In 
the late l600's, an attaint jury of 24 neighbors was given 
the responsibility to determine whether a petit jury had 
lied in its judgment. This was the only safeguard in 
civil cases against an unlawful verdict. If the attaint 
jury believed that the petit jury had returned an unlawful 
verdict, the latter had to forfeit all of their lands and 
goods to the king. Only gradually, were judges empowered 
to declare new trials (McCart, 1964).
The petit jury in the United States. Although it 
was effective in blunting the effect of unpopular British 
laws, the American colonists disliked their court system
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since, in many cases, it deprived them of trial by jury.
For this reason, they demanded that it be safeguarded in 
the Constitution of 1879* When drafted, the Constitution 
provided for trial by jury in all criminal offenses except 
impeachment (Article 3, Section 2, Clause 3). Neverthe­
less, no provision was made for jury trials in civil cases 
and opponents of ratification offered this as justification 
for rejecting it.
This resistance also led to the demand for a Bill 
of Rights that when attached to the federal constitution 
would safeguard the states and the people from encroach­
ments by the central government. The sixth amendment, for 
example, provides for a speedy and public trial by jury 
in criminal cases and the seventh amendment provides for 
a jury trial in civil disputes where the value in contro­
versy exceeds #20.00. State constitutions adopted similar 
provisions.
Judicial power was vested in the Supreme Court 
and in lower courts. State court systems, however, were 
structured separately so as to avoid overlapping jurisdic­
tions. The federal court was not meant to supervise the 
state courts and state court procedures cannot be reviewed 
by federal courts, except in two instances : when due
process of law or equal protection under the law are 
violated, as covered by the fourteenth amendment.
Over 40 state statutes vary as regards the method
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of selecting jurors and in the number of jurors in agree­
ment required to return a valid verdict. States also 
determine whether a jury is limited to applying the law to 
the facts, whether it can also determine the law, and whether 
it is empowered to fix sentences. Ultimately, states retain 
the right to abolish jury trials in state courts altogether 
(McCart, 1964).
Petit jury size. In the American constitution and 
at common law, trial by jury is generally interpreted as a 
trial by a jury of 12 men, under the authority of a judge 
(Capitol Traction Co. v. Hof., l899)* Variations in the 
number of jurors who may serve in civil and criminal cases 
exist in the states of Alaska, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, 
North Dakota, Texas, Wyoming and many others (see Appen­
dix a ). There are also variations in the number of jurors 
who must agree in order for a verdict to be validated. 
Nevertheless, 12 jurymen still constitutes a legal standard.
The 12 man jury. The concept of having juries 
composed of 12 men, good and true, became entrenched in 
common law at the time of the Norman conquest (Chitty,
1832). During the reign of Henry II, 12 man courts were 
convened to settle cases involving land titles, especially 
those involving claims of the crown. The Magna Charta, 
thought by some to be the first legal commitment to the 
jury system, was signed in 1215 A.D., by King John, 12 
bishops and 12 barons.
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In the American constitution, trial by jury is 
interpreted to mean a trial by 12 jurors (Thompson v. Utah, 
1898). It has been conjectured that 12 jurors are a 
standard as a commemorative gesture to the 12 Apostles 
(McCart, 1964). Busch (1959) cites Lord Coke's suggestion 
made in I668 that 12 jurors was not only commemorative of 
the 12 Apostles but also of the 12 tribes of Israel.
The law delighteth herself in the number 12; for 
there must not only be 12 jurors for matters of state, 
there were in ancient times 12 councilors of state.
He that wageth his law must have 11 others with him, 
which thinks he says true. And the number 12 is much 
respected in the Holy Writ, as 12 Apostles, 12 stones, 
12 tribes £p. 45] •
Forsyth (l875) has noted that the requirement of 
12 jurors follows the concept that 12 is a sacred number. 
The Constitution of Tribunals, traditional among the Scan­
dinavian countries, was composed of 12 men. In ancient 
times, 12 lahmen administered law between the British and 
the Angles, and 12 senior Thanes were required by ritual 
to investigate suspected crimes. Twelve was the usual 
number of compurgators and 12 is the number referred to in 
the Constitution of Clarendon in ll64.
The number 12, no doubt, was important to early 
man as he began to clock time and biblical scripture is 
replete with allusions to the number 12. Jacob had 12 
sons, Moses sent 12 spies to investigate the holy land, 
Solomon had 12 officers, the children of Israel offered 
God 12 bullocks, Mannasseh was 12 years old when he began
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to reign, the word of the Lord came to Ezekia in the 12th 
day of the month, and God created 12 things for men who 
served him (see Appendix B).
Another explanation of why the constitutional 
guarantee of trial by jury (Art. 3> Sec. 2, Clause 3, and 
Amendments 6 & 7) is interpreted to mean a jury of 12, is 
based on legal precedent. The American Constitution pro­
vides for jury trials as they existed in common law. In 
common law, as has been noted, civil and criminal juries 
were composed of 12 men. Congress is prohibited from 
legislating for jury trials of a lesser number (U.S. v. 
Jepson, 1950).
State constitutions requiring the right of trial by 
jury to be inviolate, prohibit the changing of jury prac­
tices, which includes the number of jury participants. In 
these states , a statute providing for a trial by jury of 
less than 12 would be void. Other state constitutions 
provide for jury composition of less than 12 members in 
specifiable criminal cases.
Still other state constitutions provide for the 
trial of misdemeanors, petty offenses and civil cases, 
by a jury of less than 12, and in certain instances, civil 
cases need not be settled by juries at all. Furthermore, 
some states require the agreement of the litigants in civil 
cases and the consent of the defendant in criminal cases in 
order to convene a jury of less than 12.
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Varying jury size. While variations exist in the 
number of jurors who may serve on juries as provided by 
state constitutions and by state statute, the standard of 
12 jurymen is firmly entrenched in American Law. This 
resulted from the legal precedence of common law and from 
the inculcation of biblical example. Yet there is no 
empirical reason, either in law or psychology, why 12 
jurymen ought to serve as a standard. Professor of Law at
the University of Michigan Law School, Charles W. Joiner
(1962) has put it this way:
As to the size of the group to be used in decision
making, an increase in size up to a point, would bring 
forth more ideas as well as increase the identifica­
tion of more active members and the consequence of them 
controlling the decision. There is no real evidence 
as to the exact size of the most effective group for 
the decision making process [p. 3l] .
The issue falls on a continuum. At one pole are 
the decisions of judges which are individual judgments; 
at the other pole stand the collective decisions of 12 
citizens, which are group judgments. It has been demon­
strated that judges who rule on similar cases differ 
markedly in their verdicts (Burtt, 1931; Gaudet, 1938).
Put another way, differences in verdicts have been found 
among individuals. It has also been shown that differ­
ences in verdicts involving similar cases exist between 
judges and juries ; that is, differences exist in the judg­
ment of a single individual as compared to the collective 
judgment of a group of individuals (Broeder, 1958).
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It follows, that variations might also he found 
between verdicts rendered by jury groups of varying numbers. 
Six man juries for example, might return verdicts which 
differ from the verdicts of 12 man juries. In such an 
event, justice would appear to be confounded by a social 
psychological variable, group size. A 12 man jury might 
find for the defendant in a personal injury case, while a 
9 man jury might find for the plaintiff in a similar case. 
Since jury size varies from state to state, serious impli­
cations would follow.
If on the other hand, no meaningful differences in 
jury verdicts were found as a result of varying jury size, 
other implications would emerge. A jury of 6 takes.less 
time to empanel than a jury of 12. Voir dire examination 
could be shortened. A jury of 6 might also take less time 
to deliberate. Since citizens are paid for jury duty, a 
monetary savings could be realized.
The problem of court delay is currently a dis­
turbing one (Zeizel, Kalven & Buchholz, 1959)• Numerous 
American courts report delays of more than 2̂ 6 years (see 
Table 1). From a psychological point of view, such a 
delay increases the problem of the reliability of testimony 
and the possibility of memory distortion (Wulf, 1922).
Differences in the cost of maintaining juries of 
various sizes could also become an issue. Consider a 
hypothetical metropolitan city which averages 5 jury trials
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Table 1*
Courts Reporting Delays of More Than 30 Months
Court, County (City) State Population
(000) 1967
Circuit Court, Cook (Chicago) 111.: 5,129County Department (Law Division) 64.3
Municipal Department 63.6
Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia,
Pa. 2,002 54.1
Supreme Court, Suffolk (Riverhead)
N.Y. 666 52.0
Supreme Court, Bronx, N.Y.
Supreme Court, Kings (Brooklyn) N.Y.
1,424 49.4
1,627 49.3
Supreme Court, Queens, N.Y. 1,809 48.4
Supreme Court, Nassau (Mineola) N.Y. 1,300 45.1Supreme Court, Suffol, (Boston) Mass. 791 45.0
Supreme Court, Westchester (White
Plains) N.Y. 808 42.2
Supreme Court, New York, N.Y. 1,698 40.2
Circuit Court, Honolulu, H.U. 500 36.9
Superior Court, Essex (Lawrence)
Mass. 568 34.0
Superior Court, Middlesex (Cambridge)
Mass. 1,238 34.0
Circuit Court, Wayne (Detroit) Mich. 2 ,666 32.1
U.S. District Court, D.C. 763 30.8
Superior and County Courts, Essex
(Newark) N.J. 923 30.4
*From Judicature, October, I967.
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per day in its various courts. Also, assume that each 
juror is paid $7.00 per day of jury service plus travel 
allowance. Over a year's time, the cost of maintaining 
12 men juries would amount to $15,500.00. A jury of 6 
would cost 1/2 that amount. Over a five year period, the 
amount of money released for other civic programs could 
amount to as much as $38,750.00. Charles W. Joiner (1962) 
finds the 12 man jury desirable, but points to advantages 
of a lesser number:
Perhaps we are fortunate that juries number 12, 
for it seems to be well within the limits for effec­
tive deliberation, although a smaller number, perhaps 
six, might be time saving and less costly without 
hindering the decision making process |]p. 31] •
In light of the evidence presented in this chapter, 
the following hypotheses are suggested in order to investi­
gate the problem of jury verdicts and deliberation time as 
a function of jury size :
Hypothesis 1̂. In the trial of an identical civil 
case at law, no differences exist in jury verdicts as a 
function of juries being composed of 6, 9, and 12 members.
Hypothesis In the trial of an identical civil
case at law, juries of 6 and 9 members require less time 
to reach a verdict when compared to 12 man juries. Simi­
larly, 6 man juries require less time to reach a verdict 
than 9 man juries.
CHAPTER III
METHOD
Subjects. Two groups totaling l62 subjects were
sampled. Group 1 was composed of 135 subjects chosen from
among students enrolled in introductory psychology courses
at the University of Oklahoma. Sign up sheets along with
introductory comments were provided to various psychology
instructors who then presented them to their classes. The
introductory comments were as follows:
You have been asked to respond to a study of legal 
processes which will take place at the University of 
Oklahoma mock courtroom facilities. You will be asked 
to serve as a mock juror. Convenient times will be 
presented to you on a sign up sheet and you are 
encouraged to sign up. Thank you.
A sample of 135 subjects were selected from among 
approximately l60 subjects who expressed an interest in 
participating in the study. They were contacted by phone 
and reminded as to the time and place of the study. Other 
subjects were allowed to come to the study in the capacity 
of alternates. The 135 subjects were randomly assigned to 
three 12 man juries, three 9 man juries and three 6 man 
juries.
In order to enhance the generalizability of the
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present study, 27 subjects were chosen in accordance with 
the eligibility requirements of the state of Oklahoma.
This sample constituted Group II. In Oklahoma, eligibility 
for jury duty requires that a prospective juror own real or 
personal property and be a taxpayer. In Cleveland County, 
Oklahoma, site of this study, names of prospective jurors 
are obtained from Homestead Exemption files and from names 
submitted to the Court Clerk by the County Tax Assessor.
In the case of married couples, the names of husbands and 
wives are recorded separately. Names of prospective jurors 
are then placed in a jury wheel to which only the County 
Clerk and the County Sheriff have access. From this 
sample, names of individuals are drawn at random in the 
presence of the judge in whose court they are to serve 
(Klein, I968).
Such individuals must be citizens of the State of 
Oklahoma and reside in the county in which they are sum­
moned. If these criteria are met, they are competent to 
serve on grand and petit juries with the following excep­
tions :
1. Judges of any Court of record, and Justices 
of the Peace;
2. Sheriffs, deputies, constables, jailers and 
persons having custody of State or Federal 
Prisoners ;
3 . Licensed attorneys engaged in the practice of 
law;
4. Habitual drunkards;
5 . Persons afflicted with a bodily infirmity 
amounting to a disability, and
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6. Anyone convicted of an infamous crime or
serving a term in any^,penitentiary for the 
commission of a felony.
Other individuals are excused from jury duty if 
they claim one of the following exemptions:
1. Persons over 65 yev.rs of age;
2. Ministers of the Gospel;
3 . County and District Officials;
4. Practicing physicians, optometrists, veterin­
arians, dentists, undertakers and pharmacists;
5 . Teachers in the public schools;
6. Postmasters and carriers of the United States 
Mails ;
7 . Members of the National Guard;
8. Persons actually engaged or employed in the 
publication of a newspaper;
9. All members in good standing of any regularly 
organized fire department; and,
10. All women with minor children.
Prospective Group II subjects were sent a letter 
signed by an associate professor of Law at the University 
of Oklahoma explaining that a study of legal processes was 
being conducted and that Norman was chosen as its site (see 
Appendix C). Subjects were then contacted by phone to 
solicit their cooperation and to answer their questions. 
Convenient time slots were provided for their participa­
tion. At that time, prospective jurors were asked the 
nature of their occupation in order to insure their 
statute eligibility to serve as an actual juror in the 
State of Oklahoma. Twenty-seven subjects were chosen from 
among approximately 35 subjects who expressed interest and 
who met eligibility requirements. They were then randomly 
assigned to either a 12, 9 or 6 man jury. Alternate jurors 
were contacted in the event that mock jurors could not keep
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their appointment.
Experimental setting. The present study was con­
ducted at the mock court facilities at the University of 
Oklahoma College of Law which includes a courtroom, jury- 
room and judge's chambers. These facilities fulfill the 
requirements and decor of actual State and County court­
rooms. Rules regarding courtroom behavior were strictly 
observed (see Appendix D).
Stimulus material. A film of a courtroom trial 
was chosen for mock jury deliberation. It was prepared by 
National Educational Television in cooperation with the 
St. Louis Bar Association. The film, Action at Law 
(prints 4 and 5) was acquired from the Audio-Visual Center 
at the University of Indiana. It was edited by the 
audio-visual staff of the Department of Psychiatry of the 
University of Oklahoma Medical School in order to eliminate 
narration, music and other portions which were not a 
generic part of an actual courtroom trial. Editing was 
done with the written permission of Indiana University.
The film presented a case involving a suit for 
damages resulting from an automobile accident. Beginning 
with the empaneling of the jury, both counsels conducted 
voir dire examinations. Opening statements were followed 
by the case for the Plaintiff, cross and redirect ques­
tioning. This was followed by the case for the Defendant, 
and again, cross and redirect questioning. The film
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concluded with closing arguments by counsels.
The Plaintiff, a 13 year old girl, was struck by 
the Defendant, a used car dealer, as she crossed an inter­
section on her way to the corner grocery store. The 
Plaintiff claimed that she was walking in the crosswalk 
when the accident occurred, which was corroborated by a 
grocery store clerk and a police officer, A physician 
testified to the fact that as a result of the accident the 
Plaintiff walked with a limp. Testimony was given to the 
effect that the Defendant did not sound his horn and that 
it was a clear day; counsel for the Plaintiff asked for 
$6 ,500.00 in damages.
The Defendant testified that the Plaintiff was not 
walking across the street, but darted out; that he was not 
speeding and that he did not have time to sound his horn. 
The driver of an oncoming car estimated the speed of the 
Defendant's car at 10 miles per hour and also said that 
the Plaintiff was running, and that she was out of the 
crosswalk. A physician testifying for the Defense, opined 
that the Plaintiff had a congenital foot ailment and that 
her limp was not the result of the accident (see Appen­
dix E) .
Rationale underlying stimulus material. Cases at 
law fall under two main headings, civil and criminal. 
Courtroom procedures in both categories are essentially 
similar. The most obvious difference lies in pre-trial
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preparation. In civil litigations, pleas, and answers to 
pleas are filed, whereas in criminal trials, a grand jury 
investigation and a preliminary hearing are required.
Basic trial procedures, however, are the same (American 
Bar Association, I960). For this reason, either a civil 
or criminal case chosen as stimulus material would be 
highly representative of general trial procedure. The 
Action at Law film presented a civil litigation.
From a methodological viewpoint, representative­
ness within the category of civil litigations was also 
thought to be desirable since subcategories include con­
tracts , taxes, wills, personal injuries and other legal 
issues. The trial presented in the present study dealt 
with a personal injury case. Averbach (1958)» author of 
an exhaustive study of accident cases, has noted that in 
the State of New York, during the period of 1956-57,
67% of all Notes of Issue filed in the Supreme Court were 
for various types of negligence cases. Of this percentage, 
6^% were for negligence actions arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents. He commented: "1 have previously
estimated that the proportion of personal injury actions 
to be 70% of all litigated cases filed, but that figure now 
proves to be conservative Ĵ p. . " He also noted that on 
a nationwide basis, it has been estimated that 809é-909é of 
all cases filed are directly related to some form of acci­
dent .
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The medium of stimulus material presentation as 
well as the stimulus material itself requires analysis.
Mock jury trials have now become the classical method of 
studying on-going jury process (Albert, Loiseaux, Mayfield 
& Wright, 1958; Broeder, 1959; James, 1959; Klein, I968; 
Strodtbeck, James & Hawkins, 1957)» In such studies, the 
method of stimulus presentation is generally the same: 
tape recorded trials of a case played by actors. The 
usefulness of this technique has been explored by Simons 
(1967)* The tape recording, she noted, is preferable to 
live case presentation because the latter cannot be repli­
cated reliably. A tape recording is less expensive to 
produce and the cost of running it is negligible. Perhaps 
most important, treatment factors can be easily introduced 
into a tape recording through splicing techniques.
Simon also prefers tape recordings to film presen­
tations :
The advantages of a recording over a film lie pri­
marily in the relative costs of producing each, with a 
film being much more expensive. Also, exposing sub­
jects to a film could induce an "audience" reaction 
in them. They are likely to become passive and less 
interested. The factors of costs and maintaining 
interest had to be weighed against the advantage that 
might be gained by having jurors see the participants
[p. 4oJ .
Tape recordings are considerably less expensive 
to produce than films, but this is less true of video­
taping. Mock trials on a variety of issues are conducted 
in major law schools each academic semester, and permission
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to videotape such proceedings might not cost anything.
More importantly, exception should be taken with Simon's 
statement that films "could induce an audience reaction in 
jurors," and that this would lead to passivity and a loss 
of interest.
The jury is an audience to courtroom proceedings; 
it does not participate directly in the presentation of 
evidence. The active protagonists in the courtroom are 
the judge, the attorneys, the litigants, the witnesses and 
the court officers. Only in deliberating and rendering a 
verdict does the jury directly participate. Indirectly, 
they may participate by providing subtle cues as to their 
emotional affect, attitudes, past experience and social 
class. Yet these cues are not recorded on audiotape. It 
is more likely, that by watching a film as opposed to 
hearing a tape, mock jurors would become increasingly 
alert, active and involved. These variables may or may 
not be helpful in arriving at just verdicts, but such is 
the nature of courtroom reality.
A film or videotape can be edited almost as easily 
as an audiotape so as to vary treatment conditions. The~" 
salience of visual perception of individuals as it affects 
individual and group judgments of them, underlies the 
whole area of social perception (Allport & Vernon, 1932; 
Efron & Foley, 19^7; Secord, 1959; Secord, Dukes & Bevan, 
1954; Secord & Muthard, 1955; Sheldon & Stevens, 1942).
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Procedure. Experimental procedures were identical 
for student and community mock juries and a pilot study 
was run in order to perfect them. In the actual experi­
ment, subjects were asked to take seats in the courtroom 
gallery until the required number of mock jurors were 
present. They were then asked to take seats in the jury 
box, after which Experimenter spoke:
Good Evening. My name is Mr. Gordon representing 
the University of Oklahoma in this study of legal pro­
cedures. As you know, legislators, judges and attor­
neys are always trying to protect sacred American 
institutions such as the jury trial. We are also 
trying to learn more about it. The present study 
will help us in that way. In a few moments, you will 
see a film of a jury trial involving a request for 
damages resulting from an automobile accident. The 
case itself is an old one and we chose it for that 
reason. We will ask you to watch the film as if you 
were actual jurors sitting in a state court of law; 
watch carefully, open mindedly and without prejudice. 
Before the closing arguments, I will read to you the 
judge's instructions regarding the law to apply to the 
facts of the case. You will then be asked to retire 
to the juryroom and deliberate a verdict of guilty or 
not guilty. When you have finished you will be asked 
to return to the courtroom with your verdict. Some 
of the procedures followed tonight are different from 
the usual ones followed in an Oklahoma court of law.
This is done so that our results will be meaningful 
on a national level. Thank you.
Following these introductory remarks, the l6 mm 
film presentation of the personal injury case was projected 
on a movie screen. Before closing arguments by counsel, the 
film was turned off and the judge's instructions on the law 
to be applied to the facts of the case were read to the 
mock juries (see Appendix F). The film was again turned on 
to conclude with the closing arguments by counsel. Jurors
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were then asked to retire to the juryroom and deliberate a 
verdict of guilty or not guilty. They were also told that 
their verdict should be brought back into the courtroom by 
the foreman and that the other jurors should remain in
their seats for a few minutes longer.
At the conclusion of the session, Experimenter 
interviewed the jury foreman in an attempt to ascertain the
manner in which he had been elected. Jury deliberations
were tape recorded without the knowledge of the partici­
pants by hiding a microphone behind a curtain in the jury­




Hypothesis JL. The study's first hypothesis asked 
whether any differences in jury verdicts existed as a func­
tion of jury size in mock trials of a civil litigation.
An analysis of the verdicts of 15 student mock juries pro­
vided an unequivocal answer (see Table 2). One hundred 
percent of all student jurors serving on 12 and 9 man 
juries voted the Defendant, not guilty. Similarly, 90% 
of all student jurors sitting on 6 man juries found him 
not guilty. In fact, only three jurors out of a total 
sample size of 135 judged the Defendant guilty.
The judgments of these three subjects, all females 
serving on 6 man juries, produced two hung juries. Their 
strong verdict commitment and resistance to group pressure 
was apparent during post-experimental interviews. One 
such juror, in referring to her jury experience stated,
"If the discussion had continued, 1 would have tried even 
harder to change their minds."
The verdicts of the community mock jurors were 
consistent with the verdicts of the student mock jurors.




Frequency and Percentages of Student 
Mock Juror Verdicts by Jury Size
Jury Size N Guilty Not Guilty % Not Guilty
6 30 3 27 * 90%
9 45 0 45 100%
12 60 0 6o 100%
*Resulted in two hung juries.
Table 3
Frequency and Percentages of Community 
Mock Juror Verdicts by Jury Size
Jury Size N Guilty Not Guilty % Not Guilty
6 6 0 6 100%
9 9 0 9 100%
12 12 0 12 100%
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6 man juries found the Defendant not guilty (see Table 3)* 
This acts as a reality check for the previous findings and 
increases their generalizability.
Hypothesis 2. The study's second hypothesis stated 
that in mock trials of a civil litigation, juries of 6 and 
9 members would require less time to reach a verdict when 
compared to a 12 man jury and that a 6 man jury would 
require less time to deliberate than a 9 man jury. This 
was based on the reasoning that if a jury had fewer members, 
the total amount of time required for each participant to 
present his view would be less, and that conclusions based 
on fewer opinions would be reached in less time.
A one way analysis of variance was used to test 
the second hypothesis. In order to validate statistical 
assumptions, an F max test of homogeneity of variance was 
run (see Table 4). Results indicated that the assumption 
of equal variances was not violated (F max = 3 .76, p >.05). 
The second hypothesis was not supported (see Table 5)* No 
differences in deliberation time existed between juries of 
various sizes (F = .22, p >.25).
Even though two 6 man juries hung, it apparently 
either did not take them long to realize that consensus 
was impossible or that sustained interest in argument was 
not forthcoming. Discussions were terminated after 12 
and 20 minutes respectively. Although there were only 
slight mean differences in deliberation time among student
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Table 4
Summary of Test for Homogeneity of Variance 
Preceding Analysis of Variance
Source df Variance F max P
9 man juries 3 233.30 3.76 > .05




of Analysis of Variance for 
Deliberation Time by Jury
Student
size
Source df MS F P




juries of various sizes, the direction of these differences 
were consistent with those of the three community juries 
(see Table 6 and Appendix H ) .
Selection of foremen. Relevant information as to 
foreman selection was ascertained by post-experimental 
interviews and by unobtrusive measures such as jury seating 
arrangements. Out of a total of l8 mock juries, kk% of 
the student and community jurors chosen as foremen sat at 
either end of the juryroom discussion table when elected 
and 39% had initiated discussion of the case upon entering 
the juryroom. The remaining 17% was comprised of three 
jury foremen: one who sat at the head of the table and
also initiated conversation, and two who neither sat at 
the head of the table nor initiated group discussion (see 
Table 7 and Fig. 1). In the later case, a female juror was 
seated at the head of the table when told by a fellow 
juror, "You're sitting at the head, why don't you be fore­
man?", she responded, "No, I think a boy should be the 
foreman."
This dialogue illustrates the importance of sex 
differences as they affect foreman selection. Although an 
approximately equal number of males and females served on 
student mock juries, only one female was selected foreman 
(see Table 8). She sat on a 6 man jury. This effect 
appears to be so compelling that even in a 12 man jury com­
posed of 10 females and 2 males, a male was elected foreman.
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Table 6
Deliberation Times for Community 
Mock Juries of Various Sizes
Jury size *Time
12 man jury 17
9 man jury 25
6 man jury 5
*in minutes
Table 7
Table Positioning of Jury 
Foremen When Elected*
Critical factor Frequency Percentages
End-table position (A) 8 44%
Initiated conversation (B) 7 39%




12 man juries 
X. table position
9 man juries 6 man juries
O  initiated conversation Q  community mock jury
Fig. 1 . Table positions of mock jurors when chosen foremen
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Table 8
Sex Composition of 12, 9 and 6 Man Juries 
and the Percentages of Time Males and 
Females Were Chosen Foremen*
Jury size Sex N % N % Chosen as Foremen
males 33 55 10012 man juries
females 27 45
males 21 47 100
9 man juries
females 24 53
males 17 57 75
6 man juries
females 13 43 25
*student mock juries only
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In the community sample, a female who served on a 9 man 
jury was chosen jury foreman. She, however, was the wife 
of a nearby metropolitan judge.
Once inside the jtiryroom, variability in the amount 
of time that passed before a foreman was selected seemed to 
be related to jury size. Both 12 and 9 man juries elected 
their foremen immediately upon entering the jury delibera­
tion room. In the student sample, at least three of the 
6 man juries did not elect a foreman until deliberations 
had been concluded and it was necessary to return their 
verdicts to the courtroom.
Post-Experimental Questionnaires
Impartiality estimates. Subjects on student mock 
juries were asked to answer the following question (see 
Appendix G): "Were the jurors in this study as impartial
and as objective as you would expect jurors to be in an
actual trial?" The choices of response were:
a. more impartial and objective
b. less impartial and objective
c. about the same--no difference
Mock juror responses were not associated with jury size
( 3 .80, p >.50, see Table 9)- That is, participants
on 6 , 9 and 12 man juries did not differ in their estimate
of jury impartiality.
Responses to the same question were also analyzed 
for sex differences (see Table 10). Judgments as to jury 
impartiality were associated with the sex of the subject
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Table 9
Impartiality Estimates of Mock Jurors
on 12, 9 and 6 Man Juries *
Jury size Impartiality Pmore same less
12 man juries 7 49 4 3.80 > .50
9 man juries 5 32 8
6 man juries 5 21 4





Estimates of Student 
Jvirors--by Sex
Sex Impartialitymore same less P
males 8 59 4 6.21 < .05
females 9 43 12
df = 2
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( X.̂ = 6.21, p <.05). Inspection of the individual chi- 
square cells suggests that females tended to evaluate the 
juries on which they served as being less impartial than 
did males.
Of a total of 27 community mock jurors, 13 or 48% 
had previously served on actual juries. The civil disputes 
which they had deliberated included: damage suits, con­
tract suits, and property condemnations. Other cases 
which they tried fell in the criminal category, such as 
armed robbery and murder charges. Because of their previ­
ous experience, community mock jurors were asked to respond 
to a question somewhat different from that which appeared 
on the questionnaire administered to student juries (see 
Appendix G): "In general, were the jurors with whom you
served before as objective and impartial as the jurors 




Eleven or 84.6% of the total number of jurors with previous 
jury duty experience reported no difference in impartiality 
between the mock jury and the actual jury on which they 
had previously served.
Responsibility estimates. Student mock jurors 
were asked to answer the following question on the post- 
experimental questionnaire. "How responsible do you feel 
for the verdict reached by the jury on which you served in
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this study?" Seven categories of response were provided, 
ranging from "extremely responsible" to "extremely not 
responsible." For purposes of simplification and in order 
to meet statistical assumptions, all categories involving 
responsibility (extremely responsible, responsible, 
slightly responsible) were collapsed as were all categories 
reflecting a lack of responsibility (slightly not respon­
sible, not responsible, extremely not responsible). The 
"d" or average category was eliminated in data analysis.
Individual estimates of responsibility did not vary 
as a function of jury size ( = 2.59, p >.25, see Table 11).
Community mock jurors were asked to make a comparative 
judgment of responsibility by responding to the following 
question: "Did the jurors in those cases on which they
previously served accept their responsibilities as seri­
ously as the jurors in today's proceedings?" Response 
choices were :
a. they were more serious
b. they were less serious
c. they did not differ from today's jurors
A total of 48% of the community jurors had previously 
served on jury duty qualifying them to respond to this 
question. Eighty-four percent answered that there was no 
difference in the amount of responsibility assumed by 
actual jurors in cases which they formerly deliberated 
and the responsibility assumed by mock jurors in the pres­
ent study. Eight percent said the actual juries were more
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Table 11
Responsibility Estimates of Mock Jurors
on 12, 9 and 6 Man Juries*
Jury Responsible Not Responsible li'' P
12 man juries 37 6 2.59 >.25
9 man juries 28 3
6 man juries l8 2







Sex Responsibility p*a b c d e
Males 13 l8 l4 17 9 10.07 <.05
Females 4 22 12 23 3
df = 4
a = extremely responsible 
b = responsible 
c = slightly responsible 
d = average




serious, and another 8% said they were less serious.
The data for student mock juror responses were 
also analyzed for sex differences (see Table 12). In 
order to meet statistical assumptions of chi-square con­
cerning the expected frequencies required in each matrix 
cell, the "not responsible" categories (slightly not 
responsible, not responsible, extremely not responsible) 
were combined (Walker & Lev, 1953)» Reports as to the 
amount of responsibility assumed by mock jurors were asso­
ciated with the jurors' sex ( X’’= 10.07, P <-05)* An 
inspection of chi-square call frequencies suggests that 
while female responses piled up in the center of the 
distribution (responsible, slightly responsible, average), 
the responses of male jurors were heavier at the extremes 
(extremely responsible, not responsible, extremely not 
responsible).
Estimates of guilt. Student mock jurors were 
asked to respond to the following question (see Appen­
dix 6) :
Let us assume that new evidence was just uncovered 
concerning the case you have deliberated. Assume 
also that this evidence clearly indicates that you 
returned an unjust verdict. How guilty would you 
feel?
Seven choices of responses were offered ranging from 
"extremely guilty" to "extremely not guilty." These 
choices were collapsed into two categories for purposes 
of data analysis: a "guilty" category which included the
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choices of "extremely guilty," "guilty" and "slightly 
guilty," and a "not guilty" category which included the 
choices of "extremely not guilty," "not guilty" and 
"slightly not guilty" (see Table 13). The "d" or "average" 
category was eliminated.
Responses to the question were not associated 
with jury size ( = 2.57 i p >.25). The same datum was
analyzed for sex effects and revealed significant differ­
ences, however (see Table l4). In the analysis, the same 
collapsing procedure was used as in the analysis of jury 
size and guilt feelings. Estimates of anticipated guilt 
feelings were found to be associated with the juror's sex 
( = 4 .91, p <.05). Inspection of the chi-square matrix
suggests that a greater proportion of females anticipated 
guilt feelings as a result of having returned an "unjust" 
verdict as compared to the males.
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Table 13
Guilt Estimates of Mock Jurors on
12, 9 and 6 Man Juries*
Jury size Guilt No guilt X"- P
12 man juries 27 28 2.57 >.25
9 man juries 24 16
6 man juries 18 9
df = 2
*student mock jurors only
Table l4
Guilt Estimates of Student 
Mock Jurors--by Sex
Sex Guilt No guilt P





The first hypothesis of the present study raised 
the question of whether or not juries of varying sizes, 
having deliberated an identical case, would differ in 
their verdicts. Because the stimulus material was a per­
sonal injury case, as opposed to other legal issues 
involving contracts, taxes or wills, it was highly repre­
sentative of all civil cases, for it has been estimated 
that 80% to 90% of all civil cases filed, involve some 
kind of accident (Averbach, 1958). Moreover, the basic 
legal procedures in trying a civil case are quite similar 
to criminal trial proceedings. Because of the fact that 
a courtroom setting was utilized and because student mock 
jury behavior was found to be consistent with the behavior 
of community mock juries, the study's external validity or 
generalizability was enhanced.
Juries of 12 men as constituting a standard in 
American jurisprudence were prefigured in legal precedent 
both at common law and in biblical example. In fact, the 
Supreme Court has ruled that Congress may not legislate 
for jury trials of a smaller number (U.S. v. Jepson, 1950).
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Jurists, writing on the relative efficacy of juries of 
various sizes, have noted that no empirical work substan­
tiates the several points of view (Joiner, I962). Nor 
does it appear that relevant small group research in social 
psychology has been utilized in evaluating this question.
The findings of the present study as regards 
Hypothesis 1 are unequivocal. Mock juror verdicts did 
not vary as a function of jury size in either student or 
community samples. This supports the position of those who 
maintain that even though jury size differs from state to 
state by statute requirement, the social psychological 
dimension of group size does not cause verdict variations 
and hence, variations in justice.
It can also be argued that the uniformity of jury 
verdicts was due to the nature of the case itself. A 
replication of the present study with a change in case 
material would certainly be useful in assessing the validity 
of this explanation. Most jury trials, however, are not 
equally balanced in terms of the evidence presented on 
behalf of the litigating parties to a dispute. In the 
present study, it was assumed on an a priori basis that 
jurors would tend to favor the Plaintiff, a little girl, 
over the Defendant, a used car salesman.
It is noteworthy that two mock juries were unable 
to reach a unanimous verdict and that both of these juries 
were 6 man juries. The entire sample of 12 and 9 man
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juries contrastingly returned unanimous verdicts. One 
plausible explanation for this trend could involve the 
variables of group size and pressures to conform. If an 
individual's opinion is contradicted by 11 co-participants, 
he might more readily shift his position than when opposed 
by 5 co-participants, whose opposition could be less over­
whelming.
In Asch's (1955) classical experiment of pressures 
to conform to a group judgment of the length of lines, 
this very effect was observed. As the size of the group 
was increased to a critical level, an increase in the 
number of subject's errors also increased. Put another way, 
as the number of opposing group members increased to seven 
or eight, there was an increasing tendency for subjects to 
acquiesce to the group judgment.
The study's second hypothesis stated that a jury 
composed of 6 or 9 members would require less time to 
reach a verdict than a 12 man jury and similarly that a 
6 man jury would require less time than a 9 man jury.
This was based on the reasoning that smaller groups could 
sample the opinions of their members and reach a consensus 
more rapidly than larger groups, simply because their 
members were fewer in number. This hypothesis was not 
supported, for there was almost no discrepancy in delibera­
tion time across juries of various sizes. The largest 
mean difference between deliberation times involved a
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comparison between 9 and 6 man juries and this difference 
amounted to only three minutes. Smaller sized juries 
clearly spent as much time deliberating their verdicts as 
larger sized juries, a fact which might suggest that amount 
of deliberation is a function of the issue involved and not 
the size of the jury. Future research might address itself 
to this question and to the problem of latency measures in 
general. For the hung juries the measure was time to "no 
decision." For the other juries, the measure was time to 
"decision."
Kalven (1966), for example, inferring that longer 
trials implied more difficult cases , found that more diffi­
cult cases required longer deliberations. It is thus 
possible to construct a D/T ratio (ratio of deliberation 
time to trial time) and compare this ratio for different 
categories of cases at law across juries of various sizes. 
The D/T ratios for the present study involving a personal 
injury case could serve as a base line for further research 
(see Table 15 ) •
The fact that no differences in deliberation time 
were found has implications for individual juror participa­
tion and group interaction as well. In a hypothetical 
case, for example, if juries of 12, 9 and 6 members 
deliberated for an hour's time, more time would be poten­
tially available to jurors on smaller sized juries for 
verbal participation. In this instance, the average time
6i
Table I5
A Summary of D/T Ratios for
12, 9 and 6 Man Juries *
Jury size D/T ratio
12 man juries .40
9 man juries .44
6 man juries .34
*based on mean deliberation times
Table 16
Number of Potential Relationships in
12, 9 and 6 !Man Juries
Jury size No. of relationships
12 man juries 261,625
9 man juries 9,330
6 man juries 301
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available for individual participation on a 12 man jury 
would be five minutes as compared to an average available 
participation time of ten minutes per juror on a 6 man
jury. In fact, in an experimental study of discussion
groups, individuals on 5 man groups reported having more 
opportunities to speak, as compared to when they partici­
pated on 12 man discussion groups (Hare, 1952).
Not only does a member of a larger sized jury have 
potentially less time for individual participation, but 
the potential nature and number of relationships in which 
he could involve himself are extremely more complex when 
compared to those of smaller sized juries. An attempt to 
quantify the number of potential relationships among indi­
viduals, subgroups, and between an individual and a sub­
group in groups of varying sizes, was made by Hare (196O). 
To this end, he has devised the following formula:
X - 3" - + 1
2
where: X = the number of potential relationships
n = the size of the group
The relative complexities of potential relationships
between juries of 12, 9 and 6 members is illustrated in
Table I6 .
It was also noted that 6 man juries had a tendency 
to delay the selection of a jury foreman until the con­
clusion of their deliberation, although 12 and 9 man juries 
elected their foremen immediately upon entering the
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juryroom. One possible explanation of this phenomenon 
involves the dimension of group formality. A larger jury 
might perceive the need of a formal group structure in 
order to carry out its functioning; to appoint a leader to 
call on other members and to direct group discussion towards 
problem solving and consensual agreement. A smaller sized 
jury, on the other hand, might not perceive the need for 
formal structuring unless rapport broke down among its 
membership. In such a contingency, an informal leader 
would probably emerge. In fact, a subjective impression of 
the mock jury deliberations suggests that being elected 
foreman in no way guarantees group leadership.
It is also likely that jury foremen participate 
more fully in group discussion than other jury members 
especially if an autocratic leadership role is assumed.
This would further reduce the potential amount of time 
available for individual participation by members of 
larger juries. Stephan and Mishler (1952), in working
with groups of three to eight members found that when a
leader was chosen, the amount of his participation relative 
to other group members increased as the size of the group 
increased.
But a second question lingers, "On what basis are 
jury members chosen foremen?" In the present study of 12,
9 and 6 man juries, kk% of all foremen were participants
who had sat at the end table positions upon entering the
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juryroom. This is consistent with the findings of Strodt- 
beck and Hook (196I) who studied 12 man juries. These 
investigators have commented:
It is even possible that a move to select someone 
other than a person at the end of the table would be 
perceived as a rejection of the persons on the end, 
while the selection of a person at the end would not 
offend anyone because it could be presumed that being 
at the end was accidental Jp. 40Ô] .
It must be pointed out that particularly in civil 
cases , while the 12 man rectangular discussion table is 
used, the number of participating juiors is frequently 
less than 12 (see Appendix A). In the present study as 
is similar to actual court practice, one third of all mock 
juries were comprised of 9 members and another one third 
comprised of 6 members. Since a 12 man discussion table 
was used, it was not necessary for anyone to sit at the 
end table positions. It was also found in the present 
study, that out of a total of I8 mock jury foremen, 39% 
had initiated group discussion upon entering the juryroom 
which is consistent with the findings of Strodtbeck, James 
and Hawkins (1957)- It is probable, therefore, that when 
no juror takes the end table position upon entering the 
deliberation room, it is the juror who initiates group 
discussion that enjoys the greatest likelihood of being 
chosen foreman.
Yet what could account for the fact that while the 
study's sample included an approximately equal number of 
males and females, only two females were ever selected
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foreman? One plausible explanation involves a social 
psychological perspective of traditional sex roles. Ameri­
cans have an internalized set to perceive authority figures 
at the head of the table since such places are commonly 
reserved for leaders, dignitaries and the heads of house­
holds. To initiate conversation in a group situation 
undoubtedly requires self confidence and assertiveness.
Even though sex roles in contemporary society are becoming 
less well defined, freeing women of their status as follower 
and role of passivity, the austere courtroom atmosphere 
might still evoke an awareness of and adherence to the tra­
ditional norms.
Post-Experimental Questionnaires
Estimates of impartiality. When student jurors 
were asked to compare the impartiality of their mock jury 
deliberation with that of a hypothetically real jury 
deliberation, their responses did not vary with changes in 
group size. In this comparison, members of smaller sized 
juries did not believe that their verdicts were less impar­
tial than did members of larger sized juries. Although it 
might be expected that larger juries, with the potentiality 
of a greater number of diverging views, would perceive 
themselves as being more impartial than would smaller 
juries, it must be remembered that pressures to conform 
are also greater in larger sized groups.
When compared to the students' estimation of the
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impartiality of real jury deliberations, a significantly 
greater number of females than males thought their mock 
juries were less impartial. A plausible explanation for 
this finding involves a historical, differential sex rela­
tionship to legal processes. American law, codified by 
males, is typically administered by males: judges, attor­
neys, court and police officers. Moreover, the majority 
of defendants at law are males. This experiential differ­
ence in relation to the law, might elicit in the female 
personality, a more idealized attitude towards legal 
processes in general, and citizen participation in par­
ticular, causing them to deprecate their own mock jury 
behavior.
Estimates of responsibility. Individual estimates 
of responsibility assumed for mock jury verdicts did not 
vary as a function of jury size. Members of 12 man juries 
reported assuming as much responsibility for their verdict 
as did members of 9 and 6 man juries. This contradicts 
the commonly held conception that individual responsibility 
dilutes with an increase in group size. For example, at 
the close of World War II, this belief was apparently 
shared by many German citizens after more information about 
Nazi atrocities became available. Again, in the classic 
military firing squad, it is assumed that individual 
responsibility is diluted if all squad members fire their 
rifles but only one rifle is loaded.
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In terms of mock jury verdicts, males reported 
feeling both more extreme responsibility and a greater 
lack of responsibility than females. Female estimates, on 
the other hand tended to cluster in center categories of 
response (slightly responsible, average). It is again 
possible that their traditional separation from legal pro­
cesses directed them to take moderate stands on issues of 
law, which may not be typical of their behavior in other 
contexts.
Estimates of guilt. Anticipated feelings of guilt 
over the possibility of having rendered an unjust verdict 
did not vary with group size. Members of 12 man juries 
believed that they would experience as much guilt as did 
members of smaller sized juries in the event that they 
had returned an unjust verdict. Again it is clear that 
increasing the number of participants does not dilute an 
individual's guilt feelings. Thus, if a bystander is 
killed in the midst of a store robbery, the gang member 
who serves as lookout might possibly be an accessory to 
the crime before the law, but may nevertheless experience 
as much psychological guilt as the gang members who actually 
did the shooting.
In the present study, females anticipated more 
guilt feelings over the possibility of their verdict being 
unjust than did males. This difference might be explained 
by variations in sex related, child rearing practices.
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Girls have been traditionally entrusted with the perpetu­
ation of societal standards for ethical behavior. Males 
are not taught to be unethical, but their socialization 
is more pragmatically oriented towards the "rules of the 
game." Illustrating this point, one male commented, "We 
did the best we could with the evidence at hand--if new 
evidence were brought to light, there would be a retrial,"
Mock Jury Deliberations 
An analysis of the tape recorded jury delibera­
tions proved heuristic and instructive. Mock juries did 
not arrive at their verdicts through games of chance such 
as flipping coins or casting lots. Most jurors appeared 
to be serious , conscientious and determined to be impar­
tial. Occasional laughter evoked during juror introduc­
tions and the deliberation itself, seemed to enhance group 
cohesion and release tension as opposed to suggesting 
flippancy. Contrary to common belief, the mock jurors 
were not impressed or swayed by obvious emotional appeal, 
in fact, they tended to react against it as illustrated 
by the following juror remarks:
Juror A: "I got to thinking he was pretty guilty
until that defense lawyer started talking 
about that poor little girl and all that 
hurting."
Juror B: "At first I was for the little kid, because
of the dirty used car salesman, but-"
More subtle social and personality variables did
seem to have their effect on jury verdicts. Jurors, as
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revealed by their group discussion, did not seem to under­
stand the judge's instructions. Confusion centered on the 
meanings and connotations of several important legal con­
cepts: "preponderance of evidence," "contributory negli­
gence," "proximate cause," "affirmative defense" and 
"reasonable and ordinary care." There also tended to be 
a curious affectation of expertise by some jurors on the 
unlikely topics of law, physics and medicine:
Juror C : (in response to a question as to whether
their verdict had to be unanimous) "Well, 
it's a civil jury. It has to be unanimous, 
otherwise it's a hung jury."
Juror D : "To stop in 2 1/2 feet, including reaction
time, you'd [the Defendant's car] have to 
be going 1 mile per hour."
Juror E: "He (the doctor) said he found tenderness.
In an ankle injury there's no tenderness."
As is a problem even with trained observers, con­
fusion existed between observations of trial evidence and 
juror inferences regarding the evidence. For example, it 
was established that the accident involving the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant occurred at 5 ‘00 P.M. and that traffic 
was heavy. Three witnesses testified to that effect. On 
the basis of these observations, one juror concluded, "If 
it was 5 o'clock traffic, he jthe Defendant] must have been 
pretty alert." Moreover, widely divergent conclusions 
were drawn by different jurors after observing courtroom 
evidence. In one instance, the reliability of the Defen­
dant's testimony as regards the make of his car came into 
question, leading two jurors to reason:
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Juror F: "A used car salesman ought to know the
kind of car he was driving."
Juror G: "He's a used car salesman, he might drive
a different car home every night."
Jurors frequently ascribed hostile or even sinister 
motives to witnesses on the basis of scant verbal behavior 
or physical evidence and in some cases, on the complete 
absence of appropriate stimulus conditions:
Juror H: "I can't see sticking that guy for $6,500.00.
She was going to need it (corrective shoe^
anyway if she was flat footed."
Juror I: (in response) "The father was probably stand­
ing on the corner and pushed her in."
Similarly, in referring to the validity of testimony by
Jimmy Fuller, the grocery clerk who testified for the
defense that the little girl was walking in the crosswalk,
one juror commented: "They 0;he Defendant's famil^ trade
with the store and it's good business-."
Not surprisingly, considerable juror argument was 
apparently based on individual expectations of adherence 
to cultural and subcultural behavioral norms. Co-extensive 
to this was the poignant role that past experience seemed 
to play in the formation of juror attitudes:
Juror J : "Fathers always are going to stick up for
their daughters. My sister was in an acci­
dent and was really hurt. If she wasn't, 
my father would have stuck up for her any­
way. "
Juror K: "I was in an accident and you don't know how
many little kids stop, look and listen in 
the middle of the street."
Juror L: "It was a female's estimate that he [the
Defendant] was going 30 miles per hour."
Juror M: "Is it possible to attain a speed of 30 miles
an hour in 15 feet, even if you had a 
Cadillac?"
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Juror N: "I've raised several children and grand­
children and have had to frequently ask them, 
'are you sure you're telling the truth?'"
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The site of the present study was the mock court 
facilities at the University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
Eighteen mock juries, six 12 man juries, six 9 man juries, 
and six 6 man juries were presented a filmed trial of a 
personal injury case. After the judge's instructions were 
read, mock jurors were asked to deliberate a verdict of 
"guilty" or "not guilty." Post-experimental questionnaires 
were administered in order to measure attitudes towards 
mock jury impartiality, responsibility and individual feel­
ings of guilt. Post-experimental interviews were conducted 
to examine the process of foreman selection.
As hypothesized, there was no difference in verdicts 
juries of various sizes, even though 6 man juries had more 
difficulty in reaching unanimity. Also, deliberation times 
for juries of varying sizes were consistent. Because this 
was an unexpected finding, the number of potential rela­
tionships in groups of various sizes, and the ratios of 
deliberation time to trial time, were explored.
Although sex differences were found, juror esti­
mates of group impartiality, responsibility and individual
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feelings of guilt did not vary as a function of jury size. 
More females than males judged the mock juries on which 
they served to be less impartial than actual juries.
Females also anticipated more guilt feelings over the pos­
sibility of having rendered an unjust verdict. Males, how­
ever, tended to feel that the juries on which they served 
acted with extreme responsibility or without responsibility 
when compared to actual juries, whereas female responsi­
bility estimates tended to bunch in more central response 
categories. Inside the juryroom, it was found that indi­
viduals who either sat at the end table positions or who 
initiated group discussion had the greatest likelihood of 
being chosen jury foreman.
In many states, recording jury deliberations consti­
tutes a felony. Recording mock jury deliberations, though 
not illegal, raises ethical questions which are of increasing 
concern to research psychologists. Every effort should be 
made to accommodate science's need to explore nonreactive 
data, and the human subject's right to privacy. In the 
present context, deliberations might be recorded without 
the participants' awareness. Once their verdict is recorded, 
however, permission to analyze the recorded information 
could be sought. This proposal, admittedly imperfect, may 
have some currency in satisfying both the scientific and 
ethical requirements of behavioral research on the jury 
process.
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APPENDIX A
THE NUMBER OF JURORS REQUIRED BY STATE STATUTES*
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Alaska : Right preserved if amount in suit exceeds
250 dollars. Legislature may provide for verdicts in 
civil actions by not less than 3/4 vote, and in courts not 
of record for jury of 6 to 12.
Arizona : The legislature may provide that jury
may be less than 12 in courts not of record and that ver­
dict may be by 9 or more in civil actions in courts of 
record where parties consent.
Arkansas : In civil cases verdict by 9 or more
jurors may be accepted.
California ; In civil actions jury may render ver­
dict on 3/4 vote. In civil actions and misdemeanor trials 
parties may agree on any number less than 12.
Colorado : In civil actions in all courts, or
criminal cases in courts not of record, number may be 
less than 12 as prescribed by law.
Florida : The legislature may fix the number of
jurors in any court to not less than six.
Georgia : General Assembly may provide that juries
may be not less than 5 iu courts other than Superior Court.
Hawaii ; Right preserved if amount in suit exceeds 
one hundred dollars. Legislature may provide for verdicts 
by not less than 3/4 vote.
Idaho : In civil actions 3/4 of jurors may render
verdict. In misdemeanor cases legislature may provide 
for verdicts on 5/6 vote. In civil actions and mis­
demeanor trials jurors may be any number less than 12 when 
parties agree.
Illinois : Legislature may provide that in civil
actions before a justice the number of jurors may be less 
than 12.
Indiana : In all criminal cases the jury shall
have the right to determine the facts and the law.
Iowa : Legislature may set number of jurors as
less than 12 in trials in inferior courts.
Kentucky: For civil cases and for misdemeanors
in courts inferior to Circuit Court a jury shall consist 
of 6. In civil cases in Circuit Court the legislature may 
provide for verdicts by 3/4 vote of the jury.
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Louisiana ; Where punishment may not be at hard 
labor, trial is by judge. Where there may be sentence at 
hard labor, jury of 5; all must concur. Where crime 
necessarily calls for sentence at hard labor, jury of 12, 
of whom 9 must concur. Where punishment is capital, jury 
of 12, and all must concur.
Maryland : The jury shall be judge of law as well
as the facts in trial of all criminal cases.
Michigan : In all civil actions tried by twelve a
verdict shall be received when ten agree. In criminal 
cases jury may consist of less than twelve in courts not 
of record.
Minnesota : Leg slature may provide that after six
hours of deliberation, jury may decide by 5/6 vote in 
civil actions.
Mississippi : Legislature may provide that in
civil suits in Circuit and Chancery courts, verdict may 
be by vote of 9-
Missouri : Legislature may provide in criminal and
civil trials in courts not of record that jurors may be 
less than twelve and a 2/3 majority may make a civil ver­
dict. In courts of record in civil actions verdict may be 
by vote of 3/4.
Montana : For civil cases and for misdemeanor
trials in Justice Court jurors shall be not more than 6.
In civil trials and in criminal trials for less than 
felonies verdict may be by vote of 2/3.
Nebraska : Legislature may provide that in courts
inferior to District Courts number may be less them 12, 
and authorize in civil trials that verdict may be rendered 
by not less than vote of 5/6.
Nevada : In civil trials verdict may be by vote of 
3/4, subject to change to unanimous by 2/3 vote of the 
legislature.
" New Hampshire : Right preserved if amount in suit
exceeds five hundred dollars.
New Jersey : The legislature may authorize that in
civil actions where the amount in dispute does not exceed 
fifty dollars trial by jury of 6 and in civil actions 
verdict may be by not less than 5/6 vote.
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New Mexico ; Legislature may provide that in civil 
actions verdict may be less than unanimous. In courts 
inferior to district courts jury may be 6.
New York : Legislature may provide in civil actions
for verdicts by not less than 5/6 vote.
North Carolina : The legislature may provide for
other means of trial for petty misdemeanors, with right of 
appeal.
North Dakota ; Legislature may provide that civil 
actions in courts not of record may be tried by less than 
12 .
Ohio : Legislature may provide that in civil actions
verdict may be by 3/4 vote.
Oklahoma : Juries in courts of record other than
County Courts, 12. In County Courts and courts not of 
record, 6. In civil trials, and in criminal trials for 
less than felonies, vote by 3/4.
Oregon : In criminal trials in Circuit Court, vote 
of 10 may give a verdict, except first-degree mturder. In 
civil cases vote of 3/4.
South Carolina : In civil and criminal jury cases
in Municipal and courts inferior to Circuit Courts jurors 
shall be six.
South Dakota : Legislature may provide that in any
court not of record, jury may be less than 12 and decision 
in civil trials by 3/4 vote.
Texas ; In civil actions and in criminal trials 
below felony, in District Courts 9 may make a verdict.
Juries in County Courts shall be 6.
Utah ; In courts of general jurisdiction jury of 8, 
except in capital cases. In courts of inferior jurisdic­
tion jury may be 4. In criminal trials verdict must be 
unanimous. In civil actions verdict may be by 3/4 vote.
Virginia : Assembly may limit number of jurors in
civil actions in courts of record to not less than 5 
in cases cognizable by Justice of Peace or 7 in cases 
not cognizable. Laws may provide for less than 12, but 
not less than 5 in trial of offenses, not felonies; 
and may classify such and set number of jurors for each.
85
Washington : Legislature may provide that in courts
not of record, less than 12, and that the verdict may be
by 9 or more in civil actions in courts of record.
West Virginia : In civil trials before a justice
the jury may be six.
Wisconsin : Legislature may provide that in civil
actions verdicts may be based on specific number of votes 
not less than 5/6.
Wyoming : Legislature may provide that in civil
trials in all courts and trials in criminal courts not of 
record, number may be less than 12.
*From McCart (1964).
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BIBLICAL ALLUSIONS TO THE NUMBER 12
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BIBLICAL ALLUSIONS TO THE NUMBER 12
Gen.
5.8 And all the days of Seth were"'nine hundred and 
twelve years...
14.4 Twelve years they served Chedorlaomer,...
17.20 ...twelve princes shall he beget, and 1 will...
25.16 ...twelve princes according to their nations.
35.22 ...Now the sons of Jacob were twelve:...
42.13 . . . "VTe thy servants are twelve brethren,,.."
42.32 We are twelve brethren,...
49.28 All these are the twelve tribes of Israel,...
Exod.
15.27 And they came to Elim, where were twelve springs 
of water,...
24.4 ...and builded an altar under the mount, and
twelve pillars, according to the twelve tribes 
of Israel.
28.21 ...to the names of the children of Israel, 
twelve, according to their...
...according to his name, they shall be for the 
twelve tribes.
39.14 And the stones were according to the names of 
the children of Israel, twelve,..every one 
according to his name, for the twelve tribes.
Lev.
24.4 And thou shalt take fine flour, and bake twelve 
cakes thereof :...
Num.
1.44 And the princes of Israel, being twelve men;...
7.3 And they brought their offering before the Lord, 
six covered wagons, and twelve oxen:...
7.78 On the twelfth day Ahira the son of Enan,...
7.84 This was the dedication-offering of the altar,
in the day when it was anointed, at the hands 
of the princes of Israel: Twelve silver dishes,
twelve silver basins, twelve golden pans;...
7.86 twelve golden pans...all the gold of the pans a
hundred and...
7.87 all the oxen for the burnt-offering twelve 
bullocks, the rams twelve, the he-lambs of the 
first year twelve,...and the males of the goats 
for a sin-offering twelve,
17.17 ...and take of them rods...of all their princes 
according to their father's houses, twelve rods;
17-21 ...and all their princes gave him rods, for each 
prince one,...even twelve rods;...
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Num. (cont.)
29.17 And on the second day ye shall present twelve 
young bullocks,...
33.9 ...and in Elim were twelve springs of water..
Deut.
1.23 I took twelve men of you, one of a tribe
Josh.
3.12 ...take you twelve men out of the tribes of.
4.2 take you twelve men out of the people
4.3 Take you...out of the place... twelve stone
4.4 Joshua called the twelve men, whom he...
4.8 ...took up twelve stones, in the midst...
4.9 Joshua set up twelve stones in the midst...
4.20 those twelve stones, which they took out...
8.25 all that fell that day...were twelve...
18.24 and Gaba, twelve cities with their...
19.15 Beth-Lehem: twelve cities with their...
21.7 out of the tribe of Zebulun, twelve cities.. 
21.40 the cities, were by their lot twelves...
Judg.
1 9 . 2 9
21.10
Divided her...into twelve pieces, and sent., 
the congregation sent thither twelve...
Sam.
2.2.13 There arose... twelve of Benjamin...and twelve..
2.10.6 ...sent and hired...of Ish-tob twelve thousand.
2.17.1 Let me now choose out twelve thousand...
1. King.
4.7 Solomon had twelve officers over all Israel... 
4.26 Solomon had twelve... thousand horsemen
7.15 ...a line of twelve cubits did compass either...
7.25 It stood upon twelve oxen, three looking...
7.44 ...one sea, and twelve under the sea...
10.20 ...twelve lions stood there on the one side... 
10.26 ...chariots, and twelve thousand horsemen...
11.30 Ahijah caught...and rent it in twelve...
16.23 ...began Omri to reign over Israel, and reigned
twelve years...
18.31 And Elijah took twelve stones, according to the 
number of the tribes.
19.19 ...and found Elisha... plowing, with twelve yoke 
of oxen...
2. King.
3 . 1 ...Jehoram the son of Ahab...reign over Israel... twelve years.
8.25 In the twelfth year of Joram the son of Ahab...
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2. King, (cont.)
17-1 In the twelfth year of Ahaz king of Judah...
21.1 Manasseh was twelve years old when he began to 
reign...
1. Chron.
6.48 ...and out of the tribe of Zebulun, twelve 
cities...
9.22 ...in the gates were two hundred and twelve.
15.10 ...Aminadab the chief, and his brethren an 
hundred and twelve...
24.12 ...the eleventh to Eliashib, the twelfth to 
Jakmi. . .
25.9 ...he and his brethren and sons were twelve.
See also 25.10 till 31.
27.15 The twelfth captain for the twelfth month...
2. Chron.
1.14 And Solomon gathered...twelve thousand horsemen...
4.4 It stood upon twelve oxen, three looking...
4.15 One sea, and twelve oxen under it...
9.25 And Solomon had...twelve thousand horsemen...
33.1 Mannasseh was twelve years old when he began to 
reign...
34.3 ...in the twelfth year he began to purge Judah
and Jerusalem...
Ezra
2.6 The children of Pahath-moab...two thousand eight 
hundred and twelve.
2.18 The children of Jorah, a hundred and twelve...
8.24 Then I separated twelve of the chiefs of the 
priests...
8.31 ...we departed...on the twelfth day of the first
month...
8.35 The children of the captivity...offered...unto
the God of Israel twelve bullocks for all Israel 
...twelve he-goats for sin-offering...
Neh.
5.14 ...that is, twelve years, I and my brethren have 
not eaten the bread...
7.24 The children of Hariph, a hundred and twelve.
Esther
2.12 ...after that it had been done to her...twelve 
months...
3.7 In the first month, which is the month Nisan, 
in the twelfth year of king Ahasuerus...
3.13 ...upon the thirteenth day of the twelfth month...
8.12 ...upon the thirteenth day of the twelfth month...
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Esther (cont.)
9.1 ...Now in the twelfth month, which is the month 
Adar...
Psalms
60.2 ...and smote of Edom in the Valley of Salt twelve 
thousand.
Jer.
52.20 ...and the twelve brazen bulls that were under 
the bases...
52.21 ...and a line of twelve cubits did compass it;...
52.31 ...in the twelfth month,...
Ezek.
29.1 ...in the twelfth day of the month, the word of 
the Lord came unto me.
32.1 And it came to pass in the twelfth year, in the 
twelfth month,...
32.17 It came to pass also in the twelfth year, in 
the...
33.21 And it came to pass in the twelfth year of our 
captivity,...
43.16 And the hearth shall be twelve cubits long by 
twelve broad,...
47.13 ...divide the land for inheritance according to 
the twelve tribes...
Ezra






THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
Norman, Oklahoma
I am sure you are aware of the current focus of attention 
on the court system in Oklahoma and on the administration 
of justice nationally. With the permission of District 
Court Judge Elvin Brown and with the advisement of the 
University of Oklahoma College of Law, we are conducting a 
study of the court process at the University. Cleveland 
County has been chosen as one of the sites for this study.
Because you are a resident of this county who is eligible 
for jury duty, you are asked to participate in this study. 
The study will be conducted at the University of Oklahoma 
College of Law court-room facilities. You are asked to 
serve on a mock jury. Every effort will be made to set a 
time and date agreeable to you and the other participants.
Mr. Robert Gordon, my associate who is directing the proj­
ect, will contact you by phone within a few days time. 
Please note all of your questions so that he can answer 
them when he calls. He will also establish a date and 
time that will be convenient for you to serve.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Cordially yours,
David Swank
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Summary of Stimulus Material
Characters : The Court Bailiff
The Judge
Fredrick Winston--counsel for the plaintiff 
Charles Avery--counsel for the defendant 
Judy Martin--the plaintiff 
Alvin Sharp--the defendant 
Witnesses for the plaintiff
Mr. Martin--plaintiff's father 
Officer Schneider--took accident report 
Jimmy Fuller--grocery clerk 
Dr. Sperling--expert medical witness 
Witnesses for the defendant
Mrs. Reynolds— motorist at accident scene 
Dr. Winkleman--expert medical witness
Bailiff: He asks for order in the court and announces that
the court is "the honorable circuit court of the 
city of St. Louis." He announces the Judge's 
entry.
Voir dire examination.
Fredrick Winston : He states that the case involves
an automobile accident. He asks veniremen if any of 
them had ever been sued, if they know Mr. Sharp, his 
family, or had ever had any dealings with him.
Charles Avery : He asks veniremen if they believed that 
a young girl should receive damages just because she 
is in an automobile accident and if they believed they 
could render an impartial verdict. He asks the court 
to dismiss one prospective juror for cause.
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Impanelment of jury and jury oath administration.
Opening statements by counsels.
Fredrick Winston: He states that on September 29th
of last year, Judy Martin was struck by the Defendant's 
car at the intersection of Wheeler St. and Sutton Ave. 
He states that Judy was on her way to get milk for 
her mother at the corner store, when she looked both 
ways before crossing Wheeler St. He states that she 
was in the crosswalk when struck. He states that 
Officer Schneider and Jimmy Fuller would testify to 
this effect later in the proceedings. He states that 
it was light at the time of the accident and nothing 
could interfere with the Defendant's view of the child. 
He also says that the girl was taken to the hospital 
and that she walks with a limp as a result of the 
accident. He states that Dr. Sterling would later 
testify as to the permanent injury to the ligaments 
of Judy's right foot as a result of the accident and 
asks for $6 ,500.00 in damages.
Charles Avery : He discusses the nature of trial evi­
dence and how in this case it would show that Mr.
Sharp, on the day in question, stopped at the corner 
gas station and continued heading east on Wheeler St.
He further states that the Defendant came to a full 
stop, inching his way across Sutton Ave. to let a
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north bound car pass by. He notes that the street 
was narrow, about 30 feet across, with cars parked on 
both sides; that Mr. Sharp was about 8 feet past the 
crosswalk on Wheeler St. when the girl jumped out in 
front of him. He states that Mrs. Reynolds, driver 
of the oncoming car would substantiate that the girl 
darted in front of his car and that Dr. Winkleman 
would testify that the Plaintiff had congenitally weak 
feet and sustained no injury as a result of the acci­
dent .
Witnesses for the Plaintiff.
Judy Martin : She states her age (ll), address,
mother's name and father's occupation. She states 
that she was in an accident on the day in question as 
she went to get some milk for her mother at the grocery 
store; that she had to cross Wheeler St. to get to the 
store. She said that as she approached the intersec­
tion she stopped in the crosswalk and looked up and 
down the street to see if any cars were coming. She 
testifies that a big car struck her down and that she 
afterwards got up herself. She identifies the man in 
the car as Mr. Sharp, and states that he came over 
and wanted to take her to a doctor's office. On cross 
examination, she testifies that she can't remember 
if the car ran over her foot, but she states that her 
foot hurts now.
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Mr. Martin : He testifies that he noticed that his
daughter began walking with a limp after the accident 
and that she never limped before. He states that he 
took her to Dr. Sterling, who prescribed corrective 
shoes for her during one of their visits. He states 
that Judy is better now, but that she still limps and 
feels pain (Mr. Avery objects and the Judge sustains 
the objection). On cross examination he states that 
if Judy hurt her foot at school, he would know about 
it, and that to the best of his knowledge, her foot 
never hurt before the accident.
Officer Schneider : He states that when he talked to
the girl at the hospital, she seemed confused. He 
quotes Mr. Sharp as saying that he saw the girl and 
applied his brakes and that the girl had walked in 
front of his car. On cross examination. Officer 
Schneider testifies that Mr. Sharp said he was going 
east and not west on Wheeler St. and that he was 
driving a 1952 Pontiac, not a 1951 Packard. He states 
that his accident report says that the girl was out 
of the crosswalk. On redirect, he states that Mr. 
Sharp told him the girl walked in front of the car.
Jimmy Fuller ; He is questioned by Charles Avery. He 
states that he had a meat sale on the day after the 
accident and for that reason, he was putting stickers
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on the store windows when he saw the Martin girl 
walking across the street. He states that he saw 
the girl walking one foot off the curb, but not six 
feet off the curb. He states that she might have 
been running, but that when he saw her, she was 
walking.
Judge adjourns court for the day.
Bailiff announces opening of court on the following day.
Dr. Sperling ; He states that Judy's injury was a 
result of the accident and that it is permanent. He 
states that there was tenderness under a ligament and 
a muscle in the right foot, along with other compli­
cations which were not present in the left foot. On 
cross examination, he states that it amounted to flat 
feet and that the pain which the girl reported was a 
subjective finding. He says, however, that the ten­
derness was experienced in the expected regions of the 
foot based on the complaint of injury.
Plaintiff rests.
Witnesses for the defense.
Alfred Sharp; He states his address and occupation 
(used car salesman). He states that on the day in 
question, he drove his 1951 Packard convertible into
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a gas station and upon leaving, took the far exit in 
order to go east on Wheeler St. He states that he 
stopped at the intersection of Wheeler St. and Sutton 
Ave. and that because Sutton's traffic was heavy, he 
inched his way across, stopping at the center line to 
let a north bound car pass by. He also states that 
about 8 feet into the street, a girl shot out of 
nowhere and that he jammed on his brakes, but that 
the girl ran into his car. Because it looked as 
though she scraped her knee, he states that he wanted 
to take her to the doctor's, but that the little girl 
started crying, saying she didn't want her mother to 
know about it. He then states that as people started 
to crowd around, the little girl ran away.
On cross examination, he states that after the 
north bound car, there was nothing to obstruct his 
view of the street. He also states that his speed 
was about 8 to 10 m.p.h. and that it was light at the 
time and that his car was in good condition. He esti­
mates that he could stop his car going about 10 m.p.h. 
in 15 feet. When told that in an earlier deposition,^ 
he had stated that he could stop at that speed in 
2 and 1/2 feet, he states that Counsel was trying to 
confuse him (Mr. Winston objects and the Judge sus­
tains). He states that he did not sound his horn at 
the sight of the girl.
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Mrs. Reynolds : She states that she noticed the girl
on the right as she approached the intersection and 
that the girl was out of the crosswalk. She states 
that she saw the little girl put down her head and 
dart across the street and that it looked like the 
girl ran into the car instead of the car running into 
her. She estimates Mr. Sharp's speed at 8 to 10 m.p.h. 
On cross examination, Mr. Winston points out that in 
her deposition she estimated Sharp's speed to be 30
m.p.h. and that she had said that the car struck the
■1
girl; she states that it must have been so, but that 
the deposition was taken at a confusing time. She 
says that at the time of the deposition, the baby was 
crying and she was trying to finish painting some 
furniture before her husband came home.
Dr. Winkleman; He states that in his examination of 
the girl, he found a congenital flat foot condition 
that was just like the flat foot condition of many 
children he had examined. He states that he did not 
believe this condition was aggravated by the injury.
On cross examination he states that it was possible 
for certain kinds of conditions to be aggravated by 
an injury. On redirect, he states that in his 
opinion, Judy Martin's foot condition was not aggra­
vated by the injury.
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Judge prepares to read instructions.
Closing arguments by counsels.
Fredrick Winston : States that Judy Martin looked
both ways before the accident and saw no cars coming 
and that she was in the crosswalk. He says that 
Officer Schneider was told by Mr. Sharp that the girl 
was walking; that Mr. Sharp admitted that it was 
light at the time with nothing to block his view and 
that he could stop his car in 2 1/2 feet going 10 m.p.h, 
Mr. Winston asks why Sharp did not stop his car or 
sound his horn. He states that Mr. Sharp should have 
seen the girl's danger and that he was negligent in 
not stopping or sounding his horn.
Charles Avery: He states that Jimmy Fuller was not 
an impartial witness because the Martin's frequented 
his store and that Officer Schneider had to use his 
accident report to refresh his memory of the accident. 
He suggests that it was improbable for Mr. Sharp to 
have confused the car he was driving and the direc­
tion he was going, and that this clouds the patrolman's 
testimony. He says that Mrs. Reynolds was the only 
eye witness to the complete accident and the only 
unbiased witness to it, and that she said that the 
child ran into the car. He states that Mr. Sharp's 
estimate that he could stop his car in 2 1/2 feet
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going 10 m.p.h. was an honest mistake and he asks the 
jury to remember that the burden of proof is with the 
plaintiff.
Fredrick Winston : He states that the little girl had
no trouble with her foot before the accident and that 
she now limps. He recalls that Dr. Sterling said 
that the injury was permanent and was likely to cause 
pain. He tells the jury that after their verdict 
there would be no recourse for the child, and that 
they shouldn't make the little girl assume the risks 
of the accident; that a fair and reasonable award 
would be $6 ,500.00.
Acquisition of stimulus material.
The Action at Law Film, prints 4 & 5 1 can be acquired 






You are instructed that the plaintiff has the 
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the 
allegations of the plaintiff that the defendant was negli­
gent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the 
damage sustained by the plaintiff.
You are instructed that the term "preponderance of 
the evidence" means that proof which satisfies your minds 
of the greater probability of its truth when weighed 
against the opposing evidence; it does not mean neces­
sarily the greater number of witnesses.
You are instructed that all drivers or motor 
vehicles must exercise ordinary care under the facts and 
circumstances existing. It is the duty of drivers to 
drive their vehicles at a reasonable rate of speed under 
the existing circumstances and to keep their vehicles under 
reasonable and proper control. It is also the duty of 
drivers to exercise reasonable and ordinary care in keeping 
a lookout, consistent with the safety rules of the road.
No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a 
speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the 
conditions and having regard to the actual and potential 
hazards then existing. . . . and to bring his vehicle to
a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.
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You are instructed that any person who suffers 
detriment from the omission or the unlawful act of another 
may recover from the person in fault a compensation there­
for in money which is called damages. Detriment is a loss 
or harm suffered in person or property.
Damages must in all cases be reasonable.
Should you find from a preponderance of the evi­
dence herein that the defendant was guilty of negligence 
as defined herein and that such negligence was a direct 
and proximate cause of the injury and damage to plaintiff's 
automobile, and that the plaintiff was not guilty of 
contributory negligence, then your verdict should be for 
the plaintiff and against the defendant.
But if you do not find that the defendant was 
guilty of negligence, then you should find for the defen­
dant and against the plaintiff.
On the other hand if you find that the defendant 
was guilty of negligence and the plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence and that the plaintiff's fault 
contributed a proximate cause of any injuries which the 
plaintiff may have sustained, then you must compare the 
negligence of the parties, and return a verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff for a reduced amount, based on the com­
parison .
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You are instructed that the defendant's allegation 
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence 
is an affirmative defense which must be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence; the truth of such allegation 
is to be resolved by you according to the whole evidence 
in the case, regardless of whether such evidence was pro­
duced by the defendant or by the plaintiff.
The Court has made rulings in the conduct of the 
trial and the admission of evidence. In so doing the 
Court has not expressed nor intimated in any way the weight 
or credit to be given any evidence or testimony admitted 
during the trial, nor indicated in any way the conclusions 
to be reached by you in this case.
You are the judges of the facts, the weight of 
the evidence, and credibility of the witnesses. In deter­
mining such weight or credit you may consider: the interest,
if any, which the witness may have in the result of the 
trial; the relation of witness to the parties; the bias 
or prejudice, if any has been apparent; the ability of the 
witness to remember and relate past occurrences, and means 
of observation, and opportunity of knowing the matters 
about which the witness has testified. From all the facts 
and circumstances appearing in evidence or coming to your 
observation during the trial, aided by the knowledge which 
you each possess in common with other persons, you will
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reach your conclusions. You should not let sympathy, 
sentiment, or prejudice enter into your deliberations, but 
should discharge your duties as jurors impartially, consci­
entiously, and faithfully under your oaths and return such 
verdict as the evidence warrants when measured by these 
instructions. At the completion of the case, you will 
retire to the jury room and choose one from among you to 
be jury foreman. You will then deliberate a verdict of 
"guilty" or "not guilty." Please have the foreman bring 
the verdict to me and remain in your seats for a few 





QUESTIONNAIRE (for student jurors)
Please tell us a few facts about yourself. You do not 
have to put down your name, therefore your anonymity is 







Were the jurors in this study as impartial and as objective 
as you would expect jurors to be in an actual trial?
a. more impartial and objective
b. less impartial and objective
c. about the same--no difference
How personally responsible do you feel for the verdict 





e. slightly not responsible
f. not responsible
g. extremely not responsible
Let us assume that new evidence was just uncovered con­
cerning the case you have just deliberated. Assume also 
that this evidence clearly indicates that you returned an 





e. slightly not guilty
f. not guilty
g. extremely not guilty
Please make any comments you would like concerning this 
study:
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QUESTIONNAIRE (for community jurors)
Please tell us a few facts about yourself. You do not 
have to put down your name, therefore your anonymity is 
protected. We simply need to know a few facts for sta­
tistical purposes:
Age: _____________  Sex:________
Occupation ___________
Occupation of spouse __________
Education: grade school high school college
Have you ever served on a jury before? Yes No 
If yes, what kinds of cases were being tried?
Were the jurors in those cases much the same kinds of 
people you served with on the jury today? Yes No
If your answer was "no" in what way did they differ?
Did the jurors in those cases accept their responsibilities 
as seriously as the jurors in today's proceedings?
a. they were more serious
b. they were less serious
c. they did not differ from today's jurors
d. other comments:
In general, were the jurors with whom you served before 





In your own words, would you please compare and contrast 
your experiences on the jury today with your experience 
serving on previous juries.
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How personally responsible do you feel for the verdict 





e. slightly not responsible
f. not responsible
g. extremely not responsible
Let us assume that new evidence was just uncovered con­
cerning the case you have deliberated. Assume also that 
this evidence clearly indicates that you returned an unjust 





e. slightly not guilty
f. not guilty
g. extremely not guilty
Please make any comments you would like concerning this 
s tudy:






























































































1 F 12 A D G
2 F 12 C A B
3 F 12 C D B
4 F 12 A B A
5 F 12 C B F
6 F 12 C B F
7 M 12 C D D
8 M 12 A C D
9 M 12 C F F
10 M 12 C B G
11 M 12 C D F
12 M 12 C A B
13 F 12 C B B
l4 M 12 A A F
15 M 12 C C C
i6 M 12 C E B
17 M 12 B B C
18 M 12 C B F
19 M 12 C D F
20 M 12 C C A
21 M 12 A C F
22 M 12 C C C
23 M 12 A C F








25 F 12 C D E
26 F 12 C C F
27 F 12 C C D
28 F 12 C D F
29 F 12 C B B
30 F 12 C B F
31 F 12 C D B
32 F 12 C D G
33 F 12 C B F
34 F 12 B B F
35 M 12 A G C
36 M 12 C D D
37 F 9 B B A
38 F 9 C D A
39 F 9 B D C
40 F 9 B B A
4l M 9 C D F
42 M 9 C D F
43 M 9 C D C
44 M 9 C F G
45 M 9 C C C
46 F 9 C D F
47 F 9 C B B
48 F 9 C C D
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Student Responses (Cent.)





49 F 9 C B C
50 M 9 C D E
51 M 9 A C F
52 M 9 C D F
53 M 9 C A G
54 M 9 C A A
55 F 9 A D F
56 F 9 C B B
57 F 9 B B F
58 M 9 C D F
59 M 9 C B B
6o M 9 C B C
61 M 9 C B F
62 M 9 c E D
63 M 9 c B F
64 F 6 B D B
65 F 6 A B F
66 F 6 C B C
6? F 6 C D C
68 M 6 C D C
69 M 6 C C C
70 F 6 A D B
71 F 6 B C A
72 F 6 B C B
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Student Responses (Cent.)
s u b je c t  sex  t H G " '  ‘' b K ï î f '  « u i l t
73 M 6 A A F
74 M 6 C F D
75 M 6 C C B
76 F 6 C F F
77 F 6 B A A
78 F 6 A A A
79 M 6 C A F
80 M 6 C A F
81 M 6 C D C
82 F 12 c D A
83 F 12 c A A
84 M 12 c C C
85 M 12 c B F
86 M 12 c B B
87 M 12 c B D
88 M 12 c F B
89 M 12 B A G
90 M 12 B D E
91 M 12 C B C
92 M 12 C A A
93 M 12 C A F
94 F 12 C D C
95 F 12 C D E
96 F 12 C D E
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Student Responses (Cont.)
s u b j e c t  s e x  “b i î ï ï f '  « u i l t
97 F 12 C C B
98 F 12 C D E
99 F 12 c F A
100 F 12 c D E
101 F 12 . C C B
102 M 12 c £ B
103 M 12 c A G
104 M 12 c D E
105 M 12 c B B
106 F 9 c D E
107 F 9 A B F
108 F 9 C C B
109 F 9 B F A
110 F 9 B C C
111 F 9 B B B
112 M 9 C C D
113 M 9 C A A
114 M 9 C C F
115 F 9 A C B
116 F 9 C B B
117 F 9 C B A
118 F 9 C B " B
119 F 9 C D C








121 F 9 A C B
122 M 9 B B D
123 M 9 C D B
124 M 6 C A A
125 M 6 C B G
126 M 6 A B F
127 M 6 C D C
128 M 6 C C D
129 M 6 C E G
130 F 6 C D C
131 F 6 C B C
132 F 6 C B C
133 M 6 C B G
134 M 6 C D D
135 M 6 c B C
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Community Responses
Subject Sex Jury Size Responsibility Guilt
1 F 12 B F
2 F 12 B D
3 F 12 A D
4 F 12 A A
5 F 12 A A
6 M 12 B G
7 M 12 C F
8 M 12 A A
9 M 12 D C
10 M 12 B F
11 M 12 B F
12 M 12 B G
13 F 9 D F
14 M 9 D G
15 M 9 A F
l6 M 9 B F
17 M 9 B A
18 M 9 B F
19 M 9 B G
20 M 9 D A
21 M 9 A F
22 F 6 D G
23 F 6 B B
24 M 6 B C
25 M 6 F C
26 M 6 D B
27 M 6 B D
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Community Responses 
(comparing present to past jury experience)
Number of 
Subjects
Impartiality and 
Objectivity Responsibility
1 c c
2 c c
3 c c
4 c c
5 a a
6 c c
7 c c
8 c c
9 c c
10 c c
11 c c
12 b b
13 c c
